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Obstruction of Justice: Redesigning the Shortcut
Ellen S. Podgor
When one looks to accomplish consistency and predictability
in the criminal justice system—important goals tied to achieving
deterrence—the architecture of obstruction of justice remains
important. It is insufficient to suggest that we have consistency
in sentencing by using federal sentencing guidelines, when the
charging process is undermined by its failure to provide
uniformity. Achieving a consistent charging framework for
federal obstruction of justice needs to be individualized, remain
true to the contextual setting, and provide consideration for the
specific processes of a trial, sentencing, or impeachment. But it
also needs to have a structure that is not rearranged dependent
upon the Attorney General, United States Attorney, the politics
of the time, or varying interpretations of government officials.
This Article examines obstruction of justice in the federal
system, looking at it in three different contexts: as a criminal
offense, as a sentencing enhancement, and as a basis for a judicial
or presidential impeachment. It provides a comprehensive picture
of the elements of obstruction of justice crimes, the challenges
brought to courts, and the constituencies handling these matters.
It focuses on the prosecutorial practices in bringing obstruction
charges in federal court including its use as a “short-cut” offense
that is easily proved in some contexts, while noting the difference
in other arenas, such as impeachment inquiries. Like its practice
regarding false statements and perjury, and unlike that for
corporate criminal liability, the Department of Justice offers little
internal guidance when selecting obstruction of justice crimes
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as the basis for a criminal prosecution. The actual practice,
as recently seen in the differing view of Special Counsel Robert
Mueller and Attorney General William Barr in examining the
allegations of obstruction conduct by President Donald Trump—
outlined in the Mueller Report—highlights the inconsistency in
this area of the law. This Article provides an empirical and
diagnostic lens to study the law and practice of whether federal
obstruction of justice crimes require an underlying criminal
offense or, alternatively, can be prosecuted as a sole charge or in
conjunction with other shortcut offenses such as false statements
and perjury.
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INTRODUCTION
Obstruction of Justice arises in three different contexts in the
federal system.1 It can be a: 1) federal crime;2 2) sentencing
enhancement;3 or 3) basis for an impeachment, most recently seen
as the basis for a presidential impeachment.4 As a federal offense,5
it is premised upon one of the statutes found in the federal code,
statutes primarily located in chapter 73 (Obstruction of Justice) of
Title 18.6 As a sentencing enhancement or impeachment offense it
may not be aligned with the statutory criminal structure or
restricted by the elements designated in these criminal laws,
although there are differing views on the latter.7
The legal process and decisionmakers also differ for these three
forms of obstruction of justice. As a federal criminal prosecution,
the initial determination rests with the Department of Justice (DOJ)
and its accompanying United States Attorneys’ Offices. After all, it
is the government that decides who will be prosecuted and for
which charges.8 Although both a jury and/or judge are influential
1. It can be argued that witnesses who are held in contempt are yet another example
of obstruction conduct. The obstruction statute in its original form included contempt
conduct. But that statute was eventually divided and placed in different parts of the U.S.
Code. See infra notes 37–41 and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part I.
3. Separate and apart from obstruction as a crime, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines provide that obstruction conduct can increase a sentence. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018); see also infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. Not discussed in this Article are the many state obstruction of justice crimes. See
generally John F. Decker, The Varying Parameters of Obstruction of Justice in American Criminal
Law, 65 LA. L. REV. 49 (2004) (discussing the breadth of both federal and state obstruction of
justice laws).
6. Obstruction of justice statutes are found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21. See infra
Section I.B.1–2.
7. Professor Alan Dershowitz argued for the violation of a specific crime as needed
for an impeachment conviction on President Trump’s Impeachment Article related to abuse
of power. See infra notes 258–59 and accompanying text.
8. See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 180 (2007) (discussing discretionary prosecutorial charging).

659

PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/24/20 8:29 PM

46:3 (2021)

players in the process, their role is contingent upon the initial
decision of the prosecutor to proceed with an obstruction charge.9
In contrast, as a sentencing enhancement, the decision of increasing
the sentence based on obstruction conduct may have been
promoted by the probation officer, the government, or a judge.
Finally, a more political posture is found in its use in impeachment
trials, with the House of Representatives considering its use as an
Article of Impeachment and the Senate next considering its viability
as a “high crime or misdemeanor.”10 But the lines in consideration
of the elements of obstruction of justice, the players or
constituencies making the decision, and the criteria for that
decision oftentimes overlap in the sentencing and impeachment
realm. For example, Special Prosecutor Robert S. Mueller and
Attorney General William Barr considered the applicable
obstruction statutes for their review of presidential conduct, albeit
with differing perspectives.11
In addition to the differing context and process used for
obstruction conduct, a wide swath of individuals may be accused
here, as one sees obstruction charges against those in the organized
crime world,12 white collar offenders,13 corporate entities,14 as well
as presidents of the United States. For example, the former
accounting firm Arthur Andersen LLP,15 celebrity Martha

9. The prosecutor’s role is heightened by the fact that 97.4% of the cases employ
pleas. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 ANNUAL REPORT AND SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS 56 tbl. 11 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2018.
10. See infra notes 241–59 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 148–53 and accompanying text; see also Memorandum from Bill Barr
to Deputy Att’y Gen. Rod Rosenstein & Assistant Att’y Gen. Steve Engel, Mueller’s
“Obstruction” Theory (June 8, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/
2018/12/June-2018-Barr-Memo-to-DOJ-Muellers-Obstruction-Theory-1.2.pdf (offering the
thoughts of Bill Barr, prior to his becoming Attorney General, on the executive function
encompassed within presidential powers).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Russo, 302 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 2002) (discussing organized
crime family member charged with obstruction of justice); United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296
(2d Cir. 2006) (discussing a Gambino Family member charged with obstruction of justice
under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)).
13. See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming Martha Stewart’s
conviction for obstructing an agency proceeding, in addition to other criminal offenses).
14. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005) (reversing an
obstruction of justice conviction against the company).
15. Id.
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Stewart,16 and baseball player Barry Bonds,17 all were indicted on
charges of obstruction of justice, although two of these cases were
overturned by an appellate tribunal.18 One also sees a wide array of
conduct constituting obstruction of justice, including threatening
potential witnesses, retaliating against witnesses who testify,
destruction of documents, and false statements that impede the due
administration of justice. The victims of the alleged criminal
activity can also differ, as they may include individuals specifically
targeted by the perpetrator, stockholders of a corporate entity, as
well as members of the public generally when there is an allegation
of an unfair election.
Thus, when one looks to accomplish consistency and
predictability in the criminal justice system—important goals tied
to achieving deterrence19—the architecture of obstruction of justice
remains important. It is insufficient to suggest that the sentencing
guidelines lead to consistent sentencing when the charging process
itself lacks uniformity. Achieving a consistent charging framework
for obstruction of justice needs to be individualized, remain true to
the contextual setting, and provide consideration for the specific
processes of a trial, sentencing, or impeachment. But it also needs
to have a structure that is not rearranged dependent upon the
United States Attorney, the politics of the time, or the
interpretations of government officials.
Part I of this Article examines the landscape of obstruction of
justice, looking at its roots, its expansion over time, and its current
applications. It synthesizes the vast literature on obstruction of
justice, including the elements of the various crimes and the
challenges considered by courts throughout the life of the key
obstruction statutes.20
Part II moves from the legal framework to examine
prosecutorial practices in the federal system of charging
obstruction of justice.21 It provides important data on the use of
obstruction of justice as a sole offense or coupled with other
16. Stewart, 433 F.3d at 289.
17. United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015).
18. The obstruction convictions in the Barry Bonds and Arthur Andersen LLP cases
were overturned on appeal. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 708; Bonds, 784 F.3d at 590.
19. See infra notes 248–62 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 27–124 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 125–85 and accompanying text.
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charges, and how its use has changed from its historical roots.
Noted here is the role of obstruction as a “shortcut” offense by
prosecutors to easily proceed against perpetrators of crimes
without the need for complicated investigations and trials.22
Like perjury and false statements, obstruction becomes an easily
accessible crime in both the organized crime and white-collar
worlds. But it is also noted here how solo obstruction charges,
without prosecution of the underlying offense, occur routinely in
federal prosecutions. It reflects on the unbridled discretion
permitted of prosecutors when considering alleged obstruction
conduct—discretion that has resulted in prosecutorial stretching of
the statute in some instances and a failure to find conduct subject
to criminal prosecution in other instances.23
Part III focuses on the use of obstruction as a sentencing
enhancement, noting the differences from its use as a criminal
offense.24 Part IV then considers obstruction of justice in the
impeachment realm.25 It does not delve into the quagmire of what
constitutes a “high crime or misdemeanor” but rather notes the
distinguishing factors in the process between a criminal trial’s
evaluation of obstruction of justice and that done in the House and
Senate in the impeachment process.
This Article concludes by not only noting the importance of a
predictable approach to obstruction of justice, but by offering a
strategy for rectifying the current inconsistencies in federal criminal
law.26 A haphazard use of prosecutorial discretion in bringing
obstruction charges diminishes its ability to motivate deterrence.
Increasing transparency on obstruction of justice charging practices
will allow for heightened accountability and provide a way to
assure consistency and predictability with a crime that is the
essence of preserving order in our criminal justice process.

22. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925 (2018)
(discussing the government use of charges such as perjury, false statements, and obstruction
of justice as “shortcut” offenses because they are more easily proved at trial than a
complicated financial or white collar case); see also Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime:
Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO. L.J. 1435 (2009) (discussing “process crimes”).
23. See infra notes 176–85 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 186–213 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 214–59 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 260–73 and accompanying text.
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I. LEGAL ARCHITECTURE OF CRIMINAL OBSTRUCTION
PROSECUTIONS
A.

Historical Development—The Peck-Lawless Debacle

The initial federal obstruction of justice statute came as
an outgrowth of the impeachment trial of a judge following his
issuing of a contempt ruling against a lawyer representing
Louisiana landowners.27 Judge James H. Peck, a federal district
court judge in Missouri, issued a court decision pertaining to
Louisiana land disputes in an opinion that went against clients of
Attorney Lake E. Lawless. Attorney Lawless responded by
authoring a newspaper article that was critical of the judge. Judge
Peck believed this article was inaccurate and prejudicial to the
judicial system, especially since Attorney Lawless had remaining
cases in Judge Peck’s court. An argument was also made that
the article might have been designed to intimidate the judge in
these remaining cases. Judge Peck held Attorney Lawless in
contempt for his publication of this article that was critical of his
judicial decision.28
Judge Peck’s contempt finding against Attorney Lawless
became the subject of an impeachment action that was filed against
the judge.29 The sole offense charged in the Peck Impeachment was
that the judge had Attorney Lawless arrested for contempt of court,
brought into custody by a Marshal, and imprisoned for twenty-four
hours. Judge Peck also suspended Lawless’ license to practice law
for eighteen months.30 Issues of freedom of the press, scope of
contempt powers, and the court’s supervisory power were some of

27. See Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by Publication in the United States:
Since the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 525, 531 (1928) [hereinafter Nelles &
King, Since the Federal Contempt Statute] (examining the passage of the federal contempt
statute following the Peck-Lawless controversy).
28. Judge Peck sentenced him to one day imprisonment and suspended him from the
practice of law for eighteen months. See Walter Nelles & Carol Weiss King, Contempt by
Publication in the United States: To the Federal Contempt Statute, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 401, 429
(1928) [hereinafter Nelles & King, To the Federal Contempt Statute].
29. See Washington, April 24, BURLINGTON WKLY. FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.),
May 7, 1830, at 2 (discussing the hearings for impeachment in the House of Representatives
and the vote of “ayes 113” for impeachment).
30. See The Trial of Judge Peck, BURLINGTON WKLY. FREE PRESS (Burlington, Vt.),
May 14, 1830, at 3 (discussing the articles of impeachment and the managers’ issuance of the
articles to the Senate).

663

PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/24/20 8:29 PM

46:3 (2021)

the considerations in this impeachment action. The trial of Judge
Peck was considered “tedious and expensive,” but reports at this
time also called it “necessary and proper.” As noted in one news
reporting, “Mr. Lawless may have deserved punishment—but the
manner of its infliction is not conformable to our notions of right.”31
In the end, the judge was acquitted in the Senate by a
single vote.32 The unusual circumstances of the case and the
predicament that Judge Peck was placed in proved to be a factor in
this acquittal.33
The legislature, however, overseeing the impeachment trial of
Judge Peck, did recognize the need to clarify the contempt law. At
the time of the impeachment hearing, section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 allowed courts “to punish by fine or imprisonment . . . all
contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.”
But the issue was whether this statute covered alleged contempt
conduct that occurred outside of the courtroom. Further
complicating this situation were the legal implications of when the
alleged contemptuous conduct involved something published, as
was the case in the Lawless-Peck controversy.34 The failure of the
1789 Judiciary Act to explain the contours of contempt, and
whether it included this form of conduct, was the direct impetus of
the initial federal obstruction statute.
Following the impeachment of Judge Peck, Congress passed the
Act of March 2, 1831,35 that provided in section 1 power for judges
to issue a summary contempt of court for in-court misconduct and
31. See Judge Peck, ARK. GAZETTE (Ark. Post, Ark.), Mar. 16, 1831, at 2.
32. See United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 978 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the
history of § 1503 of the federal criminal code).
33. Judge Peck, supra note 31 (noting that the Judge’s action may have been “excusable,
because of some peculiar condition in which he was placed[,] concerning which we have
heard many rumors, years ago—though not personally applicable to the principal accuser,
Mr. Lawless”).
34. See Nelles & King, To the Federal Contempt Statute, supra note 28, at 422 (noting
that “[t]wo inferior Federal courts” found that the statute allowed for punishment of out of
court conduct).
35. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487–88. Professor Walter Nelles and Attorney
Carol Weiss King traced the motivations for this statute in their two 1928 articles, noting
initially how there were controversies arising in state courts in Pennsylvania and New York,
but that the Peck-Lawless impeachment hearing was the eventual cause of the codification
of the statute. See Nelles & King, To the Federal Contempt Statute, supra note 28, at 409–30
(discussing the use of contempt for the production and dissemination of a publication);
Nelles & King, Since the Federal Contempt Statute, supra note 27, at 423–31 (examining the
passage of the federal contempt statute as a result of the Peck-Lawless controversy).
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in section 2 a law to punish individuals both for in-court and outof-court obstructions that were against the “due administration of
justice.”36 It is section 2 that mirrors the language used in today’s
original obstruction of justice statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
In 1948, these two provisions were split into two distinct
offenses. Thus, currently there is 18 U.S.C. § 40137 for courtroom or
nearby contempt conduct and § 150338 for conduct outside the
courtroom.39 Since its enactment, there have been several
36. Act of Mar. 2, 1831, ch. 99, 4 Stat. 487–88. It was believed that § 2 was needed to
cover obstruction conduct not provided for in § 1.
37. The current statute provides:
A court . . . shall have power to punish by fine or imprisonment, or both, at its
discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as—
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
18 U.S.C. § 401.
38. The current statute provides:
(a) Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit
juror, or officer in or of any court of the United States, or officer who may be
serving at any examination or other proceeding before any United States
magistrate judge or other committing magistrate, in the discharge of his duty, or
injures any such grand or petit juror in his person or property on account of any
verdict or indictment assented to by him, or on account of his being or having been
such juror, or injures any such officer, magistrate judge, or other committing
magistrate in his person or property on account of the performance of his official
duties, or corruptly or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or
communication, influences, obstructs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence,
obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b). If the offense under this section occurs in connection
with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the
threat of physical force or physical force, the maximum term of imprisonment
which may be imposed for the offense shall be the higher of that otherwise
provided by law or the maximum term that could have been imposed for any
offense charged in such case.
(b) The punishment for an offense under this section is—
(1) in the case of a killing, the punishment provided in sections 1111 and 1112;
(2) in the case of an attempted killing, or a case in which the offense was committed
against a petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged, imprisonment
for not more than 20 years, a fine under this title, or both; and
(3) in any other case, imprisonment for not more than 10 years, a fine under this
title, or both.
Id. § 1503.
39. See generally ELLEN S. PODGOR, PETER J. HENNING, JEROLD H. ISRAEL &
NANCY J. KING, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 169 (2d ed. 2018) (providing an overview of § 1503).
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modifications to the obstruction of justice statute in § 1503, but for
the most part it has remained constant in its terminology and
requirements.40 The most significant change has been an increased
penalty for violation of the offense.41 Today § 1503 serves as a
central obstruction statute in the framework of other later federal
obstruction laws.
B.

Statutory Base

Prior to examining prosecutorial discretion in proceeding with
an obstruction charge, it is important to consider the outer limits of
what is considered criminality by the explicit language in the
statute. But it is also necessary to see how prosecutors may
sometimes stretch these statutes to prosecute what they consider to
be egregious conduct. In this regard we see the courts providing
guidance to reign in prosecutorial abuses.42 Thus the obstruction
statutes, followed by judicial interpretation, are considered next.
1. The statutory framework
Today in chapter 73 of the criminal code (Title 18), there are
twenty-two different obstruction of justice related statutes.43
Although other obstruction of justice statutes exist within the
federal code, such as in the tax code,44 nineteen of the statutes in
40. In 1982 the statute was amended to cover witnesses. See Act of Oct. 12, 1982,
Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 4(c)(1)–(3), 96 Stat. 1253. In 1994 amendments included an increased
penalty, use of the term magistrate judge instead of commissioner, and the addition of
subsection (b), which designates penalties for killing, attempted killing, and imprisonment
for other obstruction conduct. See Act of Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, title VI, § 60016,
title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(K), 108 Stat. 1974, 2147. Finally, in 1994 the statute was amended,
adding an increased possible term if the obstruction conduct related to a criminal case that
involved the threat or use of physical force. See Act of Oct. 1, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-214, § 1(3),
110 Stat. 3017.
41. Currently it is possible to receive the death penalty for obstruction conduct
resulting in a killing. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503; 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
42. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, “What Kind of a Mad Prosecutor” Brought Us This White
Collar Case, 41 VT. L. REV. 523 (2017) (discussing cases where the Court reigned in prosecutors
who stretched statutes to cover conduct that was beyond the statutory language or content).
43. The statutes can be found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21. The reason for twenty-two
statutes as opposed to twenty-one is that in addition to 18 U.S.C. § 1514, there is also
18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
44. For example, the tax code (Title 26) has an obstruction statute that criminalizes
conduct that “in any . . . way corruptly or by force or threats of force . . . obstructs or impedes,
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chapter 73 are at the heart of obstruction of justice criminal
prosecutions. The remaining three statutes in the twenty-two
federal statutes include two focused on civil conduct and one that
serves as a definition of terms used in other obstruction statutes.
The key focus of many of the criminal-related statutes is the
protection of government and court proceedings.
Some of the statutes are narrowly tailored to protect specific
government proceedings,45 such as legislative bodies and
agencies.46 One also finds statutes criminalizing obstruction that
occurs in specific types of investigation, such as obstruction of a
criminal investigation of health care offenses,47 destruction,
alteration, or falsification of records in a federal investigation,48 and
destruction of corporate audit records.49 Conduct that may not fit
within the generic obstruction of justice conduct in § 1503 may be
prosecuted using these other obstruction statutes.50
In 1982, Congress added two key statutes as part of the Victim
and Witness Protection Act, §§ 1512 and 1513, that focused on

or endeavors to obstruct or impede, the due administration of this title.” 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a).
This tax statute does not require a proceeding or investigation for a prosecution, and a
broader range of conduct is prohibited here as the Internal Revenue Service “duly
administer[s] the tax laws even before initiating a proceeding.” United States v. Westbrooks,
858 F.3d 317, 324 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Sorensen, 801 F.3d 1217, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2015)); see also John A. Townsend, Tax Obstruction Crimes: Is Making the IRS’s Job Harder
Enough?, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 260 (2009) (analyzing tax crimes).
45. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1501 (prohibiting assault on a process server); 18 U.S.C. § 1502
(resistance to an extradition agent); 18 U.S.C. § 1504 (influencing a juror through a writing);
18 U.S.C. § 1506 (theft or alteration of a record or process); 18 U.S.C. § 1507 (picketing,
parading, using sound equipment, or demonstrating in or near a courthouse or “a building
or residence occupied or used by such judge, juror, witness, or court officer”); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1508 (“[r]ecording, listening to, or observing proceedings of grand or petit juries while
[they are] deliberating or voting”); 18 U.S.C. § 1509 (obstruction relating to court orders);
18 U.S.C. § 1510 (obstruction relating to criminal investigations); 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (obstruction
pertaining to state and local law enforcement); 18 U.S.C. § 1521 (retaliating against a federal
judge or federal law enforcement officer by false claim or slander of title).
46. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (obstruction relating to proceedings before departments,
agencies, and committees).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1518.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1520.
50. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1516 allows for the prosecution of federal audit and
prohibits conduct that obstructs the “[f]ederal auditor in the performance of official duties
relating to a person, entity, or program receiving in excess of $100,000, directly or indirectly,
from the United States in any 1 year period.”

667

PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/24/20 8:29 PM

46:3 (2021)

obstructions involving witnesses.51 These heavily used statutes
allow the government to avoid proceeding using the more openended language of “due administration of justice” found in § 1503,52
and focus instead on conduct involving tampering with a witness,
victim, or informant,53 or conduct involving retaliating against a
witness, victim, or informant.54 These witness tampering statutes
are used in a wide array of cases including those pertaining to
violent street crimes as well as white collar economic crimes. Of
recent vintage is a newer retaliation statute that criminalizes
“retaliating against a [f]ederal judge or [f]ederal law enforcement
officer by false claim or slander title.”55
In addition to these nineteen criminal statutes, there are two
statutes that concern civil remedies: one that provides for the
government to obtain a civil remedy to restrain harassment of a
victim or witness,56 and another for a civil action to protect
whistleblowers who are employees of publicly traded companies
when they come forward to assist in a fraud investigation.57
Individuals who are retaliated against have protection in § 1514A,
which allows an individual to file a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor and bring a civil action in court for relief from this form
of retaliation.58
The obstruction statutes in chapter 73 also include a definition
statute in 18 U.S.C. § 1515, which provides definitions for terms
used in other obstruction statutes.59 For example, it provides a
definition for what will be considered an “official proceeding”60
and that the term “corruptly” as used in one statute means “acting
with an improper purpose, personally or by influencing another,
including making a false or misleading statement, or withholding,
concealing, altering, or destroying a document or other
51. See generally PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 181–85 (discussing the obstruction of
justice statutes found in §§ 1512 and 1513).
52. 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1512.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1513.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1521.
56. 18 U.S.C. § 1514.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
58. 18 U.S.C. § 1514.
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1515.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(1). The definition is limited to the obstruction statutes found in
§§ 1512 and 1513.
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information.”61 This statute also specifies that the obstruction
statutes in this chapter do “not prohibit or punish the providing of
lawful, bona fide, legal representation services in connection with
or anticipation of an official proceeding.”62 This provision offers an
important protection to attorneys in their lawful representation
of clients.63
2. Elements of the crime
As one might suspect, the elements necessary for proof of an
obstruction crime are dependent upon the specific obstruction
statute being used by the prosecutor.64 That said, there are certain
generic elements that are encompassed in the key obstruction
statutes, although the list may be controversial. For example, as
discussed in greater detail below, the Report on the Investigation into
Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (Mueller Report)
used three basic elements as “common to most of the relevant
obstruction statutes: (1) an obstructive act; (2) a nexus between the
obstructive act and an official proceeding; and (3) a corrupt
intent.”65 In contrast, the prosecution of baseball player Barry
Bonds required an element of “materiality.” Irrespective of how
one lists the elements of these crimes, there is strong consensus that
obstruction operates as an “attempt” crime, as the statutes use the
term “endeavored.”66
In reflecting on the elements of obstruction of justice under
§ 1503, one can dissect the “due administration of justice” element
of this generic obstruction statute to include three factors. These
are: “1) a pending proceeding; 2) that the accused knew or had

61. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(b). This definition is limited to interpreting § 1505.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1515(c).
63. See Laina Lopez, Defending Attorneys Charged with Obstruction Under the US Code,
CRIM. JUST., Fall 2013, at 31, 32 (discussing the charging of an attorney with obstruction
of justice).
64. See generally Sean Lavin, Julia Bell, MaeAnn Dunker & Mitchell McBride,
Obstruction of Justice, 56 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1201 (2019) (discussing the elements of the
different obstruction crimes).
65. 2 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE
IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 9 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT VOL. II]
(referencing the elements for 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503, 1505, and 1512(c)(2)).
66. See infra notes 117–25 and accompanying text.
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notice of, and [;] 3) that the accused intended to influence, obstruct,
or impede its administration.”67
3. Judicial oversight
a. Generally. Throughout the years there have been many
different arguments raised during obstruction of justice
prosecutions that require judicial interpretation.68 These include the
applicable mens rea required to meet the statute and what will
constitute a “corrupt intent.”69 These issues can raise constitutional
dilemmas when the individual accused of the obstruction crime is
an attorney and the alleged conduct is part of his or her
representation of a client. Courts have also struggled with whether
issues of obstruction are issues of law or fact, an important
consideration in who will decide the question.70 The generic
obstruction of justice statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1503 includes
obstructions that arise from both acts occurring in criminal as well
as civil proceedings.71
Likewise, interpreting the term “endeavor” has produced
significant caselaw.72 Courts have looked at questions of how much
of an attempt is needed to satisfy this element. Courts have also
considered what will constitute a pending proceeding for
influencing, obstructing, or impeding its administration. One sees
an overlap with false statements and perjury73 when the accused is

67. PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 171.
68. See also Ralf Willer, Hiding a Cartel’s Traces—A Criminal Offence? A Comparative
Review of Liability for Obstruction of Justice Under German, French and US Law, 10 COMPETITION
L. INT’L 179 (2014) (providing a comparative law review of obstruction of justice).
See generally Note, Criminal Venue in the Federal Courts: The Obstruction of Justice Puzzle,
82 MICH. L. REV. 90 (1983) (discussing issues related to venue in obstruction of justice cases).
69. See infra notes 79–83 and accompanying text.
70. Typically, determining if the accused acted corruptly will be a fact question for the
jury to decide. See United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 941 (2d Cir. 1978). But see
United States v. Fayer, 523 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding these questions to be mixed
questions of law and fact).
71. See Roberts v. United States, 239 F.2d 467, 470 (9th Cir. 1956) (“The obstruction of
justice statute is broad enough to cover the attempted corruption of a prospective witness in
a civil action in a Federal District Court.”).
72. See infra notes 85–86 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Ira P. Robbins, Perjury by Omission, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 265 (2019)
(discussing a flaw in the current perjury statute).
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charged with an obstruction of the due administration of justice
and conduct involves perjurious or false statements.74
The Supreme Court has also tackled issues of the “nexus”
needed between the obstruction conduct and the due
administration of justice.75 Here again, the specific obstruction
statute may complicate this consideration. Coupled with this
question may be whether materiality is a component of the
obstruction crime.
Finally, defendants on occasion have raised the government’s
use of the generic obstruction statute § 1503 when specific
obstruction statutes were passed by the legislature to address the
criminality.76 The classic example seen here is when the
government charges the accused under § 1503 with conduct that
could easily fit the elements of witness intimidation under §§ 1512
and 1513.77 The government’s choice of the older generic statute for
a prosecution has typically been upheld as within the ambit of
prosecutorial charging prerogatives.78
74. See Decker, supra note 5, at 61–63 (discussing the use of false testimony
as obstruction).
75. See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text.
76. See United States v. Lester, 749 F.2d 1288, 1298–99 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the
defendant’s argument that the legislature’s removal of witnesses from § 1503 should be
indicative that witness tampering can only be charged under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512–13).
When Congress amended § 1512 in 1988, Senator Biden stated that the new legislation was:
intended . . . merely to include in section 1512 the same protection of witnesses
from non-coercive influence that was (and is) found in section 1503. It would permit
prosecution of such conduct in the Second Circuit, where it is not now permitted,
and would allow such prosecutions in other circuits to be brought under
section 1512 rather than under the catch-all provision of section 1503.
United States v. LeMoure, 474 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing 134 CONG. REC. S17,
369 (1988)).
77. See United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 616 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The fact that there is now some overlap between § 1503 and § 1512
is no more intolerable than the fact that there is some overlap between the omnibus clause
of § 1503 and the other provisions of § 1503 itself. It hardly leads to the conclusion that § 1503
was, to the extent of the overlap, silently repealed.”).
78. See, e.g., LeMoure, 474 F.3d at 40–41 (finding no ban in using § 1503 even when the
conduct may fit under the newer witness tampering provisions); United States v. Tackett,
113 F.3d 603 (6th Cir. 1997) (same). The government’s argument to claims that prosecutions
should be required to use §§ 1512 or 1513 when the conduct involves witness obstruction is
that there is “nothing in the legislative history expressly indicating that Congress intended
to contract the purview of the omnibus clause.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CRIMINAL RESOURCE
MANUAL § 1724 (2020) (citing S. REP. NO. 97-532, at 14–22, 27–29 (1982), reprinted in 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2515, 2520–28, 2533–35; 128 CONG. REC. H8203-05 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1982)
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b. Mens rea. Whether the accused acted with a “corrupt” intent
has been a key focus in analyzing the appellate decisions with
convictions under various obstruction of justice statutes. In this
regard, acting corruptly is not confined to one definition or set of
specific conduct. Some court opinions reflect on whether there is
specific proof of an intent to act “corruptly”79 while other courts do
not require an evil motive.80 When examining the specific act to
determine if the conduct was corrupt, courts have found conduct
of bribery,81 destruction of documents,82 and fraudulent acts83 to
satisfy this element of the crime. The controversy in considering
this question is seen when comparing the Mueller Report on the
alleged obstruction acts by President Trump, followed by Attorney
General Barr’s decision that the conduct was not conducted with a
corrupt intent.84
c. Endeavor. As previously noted, the generic obstruction of
justice statute, § 1503, as well as some of the other obstruction
statutes, do not require a completion of the crime. The term
“endeavor” in the statute allows it to encompass attempt acts. A
defense that the obstruction was thwarted or impossible to
complete will not serve as a defense to the crime.85 Although the
use of the term “endeavor” is similar to attempt conduct, it does not
require proof of the elements necessary for attempt crimes. Thus,
(section-by-section analysis of H.R. 7191)), https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminalresource-manual-1724-protection-government-processes-omnibus-clause-18-usc-1503.
79. See United States v. Brand, 775 F.2d 1460 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding insufficient
evidence of a corrupt motive).
80. See United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir. 1979) (finding that attempting to
influence a juror is per se an unlawful corrupt act).
81. See United States v. Osborn, 350 F.2d 497, 505 (6th Cir. 1965) (finding that telling
someone to bribe a juror is a corrupt endeavor for obstruction).
82. See generally Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the
Courthouse: Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 570 (1992) (advocating for a Model Penal Code approach in interpreting the
mens rea element of obstruction of justice).
83. United States v. Polakoff, 121 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1941) (finding a fraudulent act
sufficient in meeting the obstruction statute).
84. See infra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333 (1966) (noting that the use of the
word “endeavor” in the statute does not require success in accomplishing the corruption
act); United States v. Edwards, 36 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that it is not “required
that the attempted obstruction be successful”); United States v. Bucey, 876 F.2d 1297, 1314
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the impossibility to accomplish the obstruction of the
administration of justice does not preclude a conviction).
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proof of the accused having taken a “substantial step” to
completion of the crime is not required. It operates comparable to a
solicitation type of crime.86
d. The Due Administration of Justice. As noted, the components
of the “due administration of justice” element are: “1) a pending
proceeding; 2) that the accused knew or had notice of[;] and 3) that
the accused intended to influence, obstruct, or impede its
administration.”87 Courts have included grand jury, trial, and
appellate proceedings as within the “pending proceeding”
language.88 Although § 1503, the generic obstruction statute, does
not cover proceedings before agencies or legislative bodies, other
statutes do cover this conduct.89
The necessity for a “pending proceeding” has been met when
the conduct involved the accused speaking to a probation officer in
anticipation of sentencing.90 But if there is no evidence that a grand
jury is pending, it may not suffice for meeting the requirement of a
pending proceeding.91 Where some courts hold that “the acts
complained of must bear a reasonable relationship to the subject of
the grand jury inquiry,”92 other courts reject this approach.93
The accused also needs to know of the pending proceedings.
Requiring a mens rea for the pending proceeding aspect of the
statute was solidified in the Supreme Court decision of Pettibone v.
United States,94 although an older statute was used in this particular
case. Newer cases have equated this element with the nexus
86. See United States v. Fasolino, 586 F.2d 939, 940 (2d Cir. 1978).
87. See PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 170.
88. Although appeals are covered as a pending proceeding, when the time for filing
the appeal had expired, it was held not to be within the scope of a pending proceeding.
See United States v. Fulbright, 105 F.3d 443 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that an appeal was no
longer a pending proceeding once the appellate clock had run).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (governing “[o]bstruction of proceedings before departments,
agencies, and committees”).
90. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1491 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding it
was immaterial whether complaint was filed minutes after the interview instead of minutes
before the interview).
91. See United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728, 733 (9th Cir. 1971).
92. Id. at 734.
93. See United States v. Erickson, 561 F.3d 1150, 1161 (10th Cir. 2009) (finding that the
government does not need to prove that the obstructive acts were relevant to the grand jury’s
investigation). In a § 1505 case, the Tenth Circuit held that agency investigative activities
were “proceedings” within the meaning of obstruction of “proceedings” before departments,
agencies, or committees. See United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483 (10th Cir. 1984).
94. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197 (1893).
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requirement and in some instances required a direct knowledge of
the pending proceeding. For example, in Marinello v. United States,95
an obstruction case brought under a tax obstruction statute, the
Supreme Court held that “[j]ust because a taxpayer knows that the
IRS will review her tax return every year does not transform every
violation of the Tax Code into an obstruction charge.”96
So, although it may not be necessary to know that the proceeding
is federal,97 it is necessary to know of the pending proceeding.
The final aspect of the due administration of justice portion of
the obstruction statute is the requirement to show an intent to
influence, obstruct, or impede. Here again, evidence that may be
used in an obstruction case may meet several different elements.
The most noticeable exclusions here are instances when the grand
jury or proceedings have ended and therefore cannot meet this
element.98 That said, other obstruction statutes can be used to
prosecute this conduct. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1513 prohibits
“[r]etaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant.”99
e. Nexus. One of the more controversial elements of obstruction
statutes has been the requirement of a “nexus,” which is provided
by a link between a false statement and the obstruction of the due
administration of justice.100 The “nexus” element proved to be a
matter of concern in the criminal case against Judge Robert Aguilar,
a United States District Court judge for the Northern District of
California,101 and also in the prosecution of Arthur Andersen
LLP,102 as well as in many other cases.
Judge Aguilar’s case alleged his disclosure of a wiretap and
obstruction of justice in providing a false statement to an
investigating officer. He was convicted under a statute that made it
illegal to disclose wiretap information, and also for a violation of
the obstruction statute in § 1503 for endeavoring to obstruct the due

95. Marinello v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1101 (2018).
96. Id. at 1110.
97. See United States v. Ardito, 782 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1986).
98. See United States v. Bashaw, 982 F.2d 168 (6th Cir. 1992) (threatening jurors whose
service has ended does not meet the obstruction statute).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 1513; see United States v. Bailey, 931 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2019) (affirming
conviction on guilty plea for retaliating against a witness after a trial).
100. See PODGOR ET AL., supra note 39, at 177–78.
101. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995).
102. Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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administration of justice.103 The Supreme Court affirmed the
en banc Ninth Circuit’s reversal of the obstruction conviction.104
The Court held that an “endeavor” to obstruct does not require
that the act be successful. It is necessary, however, for the defendant
to know that his or her acts would be used before a
judicial proceeding. The Court stated, “if the defendant lacks
knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial
proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct.”105 The Court
noted that “[t]he Government did not show here that the agents
acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had
even summoned the testimony of these particular agents.”106
The nexus requirement was also a key issue in the Arthur
Andersen LLP107 case that was reversed by the Supreme Court.
The company, which had been “Enron’s auditor, instructed its
employees to destroy documents pursuant to its document
retention policy.”108 Charged and found guilty of violating
18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2)(A), the Supreme Court reviewed the jury
instructions used in the case. The Court gave examples of the lack
of culpability required by the instructions, including noting that
“[t]he instructions also diluted the meaning of ‘corruptly’ so that
it covered innocent conduct.”109 In reversing the conviction, the
Court found the instructions improper because “[t]hey led the jury
to believe that it did not have to find any nexus between
the
‘persua[sion]’
to
destroy
documents
and
any
particular proceeding.”110
f. Materiality. Materiality111 as an element of an obstruction of
justice offense is not a clearly accepted principle. For one, the key

103. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 595.
104. Id. at 606. The en banc Ninth Circuit had reversed both convictions, but the
Supreme Court, while affirming the decision on the obstruction count, reversed the wiretap
conviction. Id.
105. Id. at 599.
106. Id. at 600.
107. Arthur Andersen LLP, 544 U.S. at 707–08.
108. Id. at 698.
109. Id. at 706.
110. Id. at 707.
111. Materiality is typically defined as “ha[ving] a natural tendency to influence”
although the object of the influence differs by the respective statute that requires materiality.
See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 807–08 (1988) (examining materiality as it related
to “[influencing] decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service”).
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obstruction statutes do not include the word “materiality.”
Likewise, older court decisions did not focus on materiality as a
required element necessary for these offenses.112
The Supreme Court spoke clearly in finding that a key false
statement statute requires materiality,113 although it also found that
a different false statement statute did not include a materiality
element.114 The confusion as to when materiality is required is also
seen in determining whether it is an element in prosecutions of
fraud. Although the word “materiality” is not found in the classic
criminal fraud statutes, like mail and wire fraud, the Court found it
to be an element of these offenses. Using a common law approach,
the Court held in Neder v. United States115 that “materiality of
falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and
bank fraud statutes.”116
Although the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the
question of whether materiality is a required element in an
obstruction case, an en banc Ninth Circuit decision did so. Celebrity
baseball player Barry Bonds117 was questioned in front of a federal
grand jury for approximately three hours on his “suspected use of
steroids.”118 His testimony resulted in him being charged with four
counts of making a false statement and one count of obstruction of
justice. The obstruction was premised on his alleged false testimony
before the grand jury.119 With the exception of being convicted on
the obstruction count, the other charges resulted in a hung jury.120
The Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction because there was
“insufficient evidence” that the statement used by the prosecution
as proof of an obstruction of justice under § 1503 was “material” to
the grand jury investigation.
112. See Ellen S. Podgor, Arthur Andersen, LLP and Martha Stewart: Should Materiality Be
an Element of Obstruction of Justice?, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 583 (2005) (discussing how materiality
was not being used as an element in obstruction cases and advocating for a change).
113. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995) (finding that the resolution of
materiality was a question for the jury as opposed to the judge).
114. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482 (1997) (finding that materiality was not an
element of 18 U.S.C. § 1014).
115. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (1999).
116. Id. at 25.
117. United States v. Bonds, 784 F.3d 582 (9th Cir. 2015).
118. Id. at 582.
119. Id. at 582–83.
120. Id.

676

PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE)

677

9/24/20 8:29 PM

Obstruction of Justice: Redesigning the Shortcut

The Bonds court was concerned about the breadth of the generic
obstruction statute, stating that “[s]tretched to its limits, § 1503
poses a significant hazard for everyone involved in our system of
justice, because so much of what the adversary process calls for
could be construed as obstruction.”121 It proved particularly
problematic in this case where the alleged obstruction was a single
statement which consisted of two questions and two answers to
those questions.122 It was this statement alone that formed the basis
of the alleged obstruction conduct. The Ninth Circuit held that
“[m]ateriality screens out many of the statute’s troubling
applications by limiting convictions to those situations where an act
‘has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable of influencing,
the decision of the decisionmaking body.’”123 A concurring opinion
noted that a “single truthful but evasive or misleading statement
can never be material.”124
In examining the elements specific to one obstruction of justice
statute, it is important to note that the statutes in chapter 73 of Title
18 do differ. What might be excluded under one statute may be
allowed under another. The more specific statutes offer a greater
range of conduct to be prosecuted while also maintaining the
current breadth of the generic statute found in § 1503.
II. PROSECUTORIAL PRACTICES IN CHARGING OBSTRUCTION CRIMES
A.

Generally

A long list of different forms of conduct has been the basis for
an obstruction charge under § 1503, the founding obstruction
statute. The Criminal Resource Manual that accompanies the U.S.
Attorneys’ Justice Manual125 includes the following conduct as the
basis of convictions under § 1503: “[e]ndeavoring to suborn
perjury[,]” “[e]ndeavoring to influence a witness not to testify or to

121. Id. at 584.
122. Id. at 583.
123. Id. at 585 (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)). In Kungys, the Court
was considering materiality in connection with the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
8 U.S.C. § 1451(a).
124. Bonds, 784 F.3d at 589.
125. “The Justice Manual contains publicly available Department of Justice (DOJ)
policies and procedures.” U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 1-1.100 (2018),
https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-1-1000-introduction.
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make himself/herself unavailable to testify[,]” “[g]iving false
denials of knowledge and memory, or evasive answers[,]”
“[f]alsifying a report likely to be submitted to a grand jury[,]”
“[d]estroying, altering, or concealing subpoenaed documents[,]”
“[e]ndeavoring to sell grand jury transcripts[,]” “[o]ffering to sell a
guarantee of a jury acquittal to a defense counsel[,]” “[e]ndeavoring
to influence, through a third party, a judge[,]” “[d]eliberately
concealing one’s identity thereby preventing a court from gathering
information necessary to exercise its discretion in imposing a
sentence[,]” “[o]btaining secret grand jury testimony[,]”
“[s]ubmitting false or misleading information to the grand
jury[,]”or “[r]efusing to testify before the grand jury.”126 The list
grows even longer when one includes other obstruction statutes
that include conduct before federal government agencies and the
legislative body.
Typically, oversight of the charging process is minimal and
guidance may be limited to what is stated internally to government
prosecutors.127 The Justice Manual provides general considerations
for initiating and declining prosecution and the probable cause
requirement necessary to bring charges.128 Key in commencing
prosecution is the finding of a “federal offense [and having]
admissible evidence will probably be sufficient to obtain and
sustain a conviction.”129 But it is noted that prosecution should be
declined when (1) the prosecution would serve “no substantial
126. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 78, § 1724.
127. The Justice Manual (previously U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) provides as follows:
Generally, obstruction of justice offenses fall under the supervisory responsibility
of the Division and Section of the Department having responsibility for, or
expertise in, the basic subject matter. For example, obstruction of an investigation
into health care fraud would fall under the supervision of the Fraud Section of the
Criminal Division; obstruction involving violence against a witness would fall
under the supervision of the Gang Unit of the Criminal Division; obstruction of a
gambling investigation would fall under the supervision of the Organized Crime
and Racketeering Section of the Criminal Division; and obstruction of a public
corruption investigation or a congressional proceeding would fall under the
supervision of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division.
If such responsibility cannot be identified, supervisory responsibility rests with
the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division.
U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-69.100 (2009), https://www.justice.gov/archives/
usam/archives/usam-9-69000-protection-government-processes#9-69.100.
128. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-27.200 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/
archives/usam/archives/usam-9-27000-principles-federal-prosecution#9-27.200.
129. Id. at § 9-27.220.
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federal interest[;]” (2) the “person is subject to effective prosecution
in another jurisdiction;” or (3) “there exists an adequate noncriminal alternative to prosecution.”130 The Justice Manual specifies
factors that are impermissible considerations, such as race, sexual
orientation, and “the possible affect [sic] of the decision on the
attorney’s own professional or personal circumstances.”131 One also
finds guidance stating that one should charge the most serious
offense and that each U.S. Attorneys’ Office should create internal
office policies in order to have a charging review process.132 This
guidance is minimal in comparison to the more detailed guidance
provided to prosecutors who are considering proceeding against
corporations. Corporate guidelines tell prosecutors to use the
individual guidance provided, but then note that “due to the nature
of the corporate ‘person,’ some additional factors are present.”133
These include factors such as the “corporation’s timely and
voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing[,]” the “pervasiveness of
wrongdoing within the corporation[,]”134 and their cooperation in
the prosecution of individuals.135 Throughout the years, different
Attorneys General and Deputy Attorneys General have issued

130. Id. Later sections of the Justice Manual (U.S. Attorneys’ Manual) provide “relevant
considerations” for substantial federal interest as well as guidance for other reasons
for declining prosecution, such as a prosecution in another jurisdiction. Id. at §§ 9-27.230
to 9-27.250.
131. Id. at § 9-27.260.
132. Id. at § 9-27.300. The Justice Manual states:
To ensure consistency and accountability, charging and plea agreement decisions
must be reviewed by a supervisory attorney. All but the most routine indictments
should be accompanied by a prosecution memorandum that identifies the
charging options supported by the evidence and the law and explains the charging
decision therein. Each United States Attorney’s Office and litigating division of the
Department is required to promulgate written guidance describing its internal
indictment review process.
Id.
133. U.S.
Dep’t
of
Just.,
Just.
Manual
§ 9-28.300
(2015),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/usam/archives/usam-9-28000-principles-federalprosecution-business-organizations.
134. Id. A key consideration in recent years is corporate cooperation. In discussing the
value of cooperation, the Justice Manual states, “[i]n order for a company to receive any
consideration for cooperation under this section, the company must identify all individuals
substantially involved in or responsible for the misconduct at issue, regardless of their
position, status or seniority, and provide to the Department all relevant facts relating to that
misconduct.” Id. at § 9-28.700.
135. Id.
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memos to instruct Assistant United States Attorneys on how to
handle corporate investigations and charging.136
Use of obstruction of justice is referenced here as a
“short-cut”137 offense because this crime allows prosecutors to
charge the conduct without needing to present to a jury a
complicated case. This can be particularly important in white collar
cases where there might have been a lengthy investigation,
significant financial data, and a need for a jury to understand an
intricate fraudulent transaction. Instead, charging perjury, false
statements, or obstruction of justice bypasses the need to explain
the transactions to the jury and provides a way to secure a
conviction by proving the accused lied to federal officers, a grand
jury, an agency, or obstructed an investigation. It also allows some
prosecutors to stack charges with the same conduct being charged
as both false statements, perjury, and obstruction of justice.138
B.

The Mueller Investigation & Response

In the Mueller Report, Robert S. Mueller and his team examine
ten alleged acts of President Donald J. Trump, considering them in
conjunction with the elements of the federal criminal obstruction of
justice statutes. The Mueller Report also provides an overview of
136. See Katrice Bridges Copeland, The Yates Memo: Looking for “Individual
Accountability” in All the Wrong Places, 102 IOWA L. REV. 1897 (2017) (discussing former
Deputy Attorney General Sally Yates’ corporate charging memorandum); Miriam Hechler
Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 969 (2009) (discussing former
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson’s corporate charging memorandum); Lisa Kern
Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311,
316 (2007) (discussing the corporate charging memorandum of former Deputy Attorney
Generals Thompson and McNulty).
137. Erin Murphy, Manufacturing Crime: Process, Pretext, and Criminal Justice, 97 GEO.
L.J. 1435 (2009) (discussing “process crimes”); Stuart P. Green, Uncovering the Cover-up
Crimes, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 9, 9–13 (2005) (examining the government’s charging of coverup crimes); see also Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1137 (2004)
(discussing “pretextual prosecutions” for charging individuals as opposed to focusing on the
offense itself). See generally Ellen S. Podgor, White Collar Shortcuts, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 925
(2018) (analyzing the government’s use of “pretextual,” “process,” or just more easily proved
crimes to assure a favorable jury resolution).
138. See Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN STATE L. REV. 1107 (2005)
(discussing how prosecutors will charge the same conduct using multiple different crimes).
Prosecutors also will tack on charges such as money laundering and conspiracy.
See Teresa E. Adams, Note, Tacking on Money Laundering Charges to White Collar Crimes: What
Did Congress Intend, and What Are the Courts Doing?, 17 GA. STATE U. L. REV. 531 (2000)
(discussing how prosecutors will add money laundering charges in white collar cases).
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these ten acts and an additional cumulative consideration in the
final section. Even if these acts do meet the elements of the
applicable obstruction statutes, there is likewise a disparity in view
as to whether this should be a basis for indictment or
impeachment—as the statutes were being examined against the
conduct of a sitting President.139 The Mueller Report notes that
an Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo found that a sitting
president cannot be indicted, and notes that “this Office
accepted OLC’s legal conclusion for the purpose of exercising
prosecutorial jurisdiction.”140
Further, although the Mueller Report provides extensive
analysis for each of these ten separate instances that might be
considered as obstruction of justice conduct,141 this activity did not
form the basis of the two acts of impeachment later brought against
President Trump. Instead, the articles of impeachment against
President Trump centered on obstruction of justice, but it was the
obstruction of the legislative body investigating his case that was
the focus, not the alleged obstructive acts found in the Mueller
Report. Thus, the Mueller Report, although referenced at various
parts of the impeachment hearings and trial, did not serve as the
basis for the impeachment against President Trump.
Although the Mueller Report was not a basis for impeachment,
it is important to examine this report and the reaction of Attorney
General Barr, as it illuminates an approach to the use of obstruction
of justice in his office and, some may conclude, the arbitrariness of
its application.
The Mueller Report is presented in two volumes. The first
examines “Russia’s interference in the 2016 presidential election
and its interactions with the Trump Campaign.”142 Volume Two,
the focus of obstructive acts, “addresses the President’s actions
towards the FBI’s investigation into Russia’s interference in the
2016 presidential election and related matters, and his actions

139. See generally Ediberto Roman, Melissa Gonzalez & Dianet Torres, Collusion,
Obstruction of Justice, and Impeachment, 45 J. LEGIS. 9, 37–46 (2018) (discussing whether a sitting
President can be criminally indicted).
140. MUELLER REPORT VOL. II, supra note 65, at 1.
141. Id.
142. 1 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE
IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2 (2019) [hereinafter MUELLER REPORT VOL. I].
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towards the Special Counsel’s investigation.”143 The Mueller Report
notes that his team did not make a “traditional prosecutorial
judgment.”144 It notes that “[t]he conclusion that Congress may
apply the obstruction laws to the President’s corrupt exercise of the
powers of office accords with our constitutional system of checks
and balances and the principle that no person is above the law.”145
But the Mueller Report also notes that “if we had confidence after a
thorough investigation of the facts that the President clearly did not
commit obstruction of justice, we would so state.”146 The executive
summary of Volume II concludes: “Accordingly, while this report
does not conclude that the President committed a crime, it also does
not exonerate him.”147
Prior to releasing the Mueller Report with some redactions,
Attorney General William P. Barr issued a letter on March 24,
2019,148 that references the obstruction allegations. The letter states:
After reviewing the Special Counsel’s final report on these
issues; consulting with Department officials, including the Office
of Legal Counsel; and applying the principles of federal
prosecution that guide our charging decisions, Deputy Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein and I have concluded that the evidence
developed during the Special Counsel’s investigation is not
sufficient to establish that the President committed an
obstruction-of-justice offense.149

Despite the exhaustive evidence and specificity in the Mueller
Report, Attorney General Barr found that

143. Id. at 3.
144. MUELLER REPORT VOL. II, supra note 65, at 8.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Letter from William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., to Lindsey Graham, Chairman for the
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Jerrold Nadler, Chairman for the U.S. House of
Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary, Dianne Feinstein, Ranking Member for the
U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, and Doug Collins, Ranking Member for the
U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1147981/download.
149. Id. at 3. Attorney General Barr states that his determination was “made without
regard to, and is not based on, the constitutional considerations that surround the indictment
and criminal prosecution of a sitting president.” Id. (citing A Sitting President’s Amenability
to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution, 24 Op. O.L.C. 222 (2000)).
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[i]n making this determination, we noted that the Special Counsel
recognized that “the evidence does not establish that the
President was involved in an underlying crime related to Russian
election interference,” and that, while not determinative, the
absence of such evidence bears upon the President’s intent with
respect to obstruction.150

In his later remarks on April 18, 2019,151 Attorney General Barr
noted that “[a]part from whether the acts were obstructive, this
evidence of non-corrupt motives weighs heavily against any
allegation that the President had a corrupt intent to obstruct the
investigation.”152
150. Id. He further states:
Generally speaking, to obtain and sustain an obstruction conviction, the
government would need to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person, acting
with corrupt intent, engaged in obstructive conduct with a sufficient nexus to a
pending or contemplated proceeding. In cataloguing the President’s actions, many
of which took place in public view, the report identifies no actions that, in our
judgment, constitute obstructive conduct, had a nexus to a pending or
contemplated proceeding, and were done with corrupt intent, each of which,
under the Department’s principles of federal prosecution guiding charging
decisions, would need to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to establish an
obstruction-of-justice offense.
Id.
151. William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., Remarks on the Release of the Report on the
Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 Presidential Election (Apr. 18, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-remarksrelease-report-investigation-russian.
152. Id. Attorney General Barr stated:
After carefully reviewing the facts and legal theories outlined in the report,
and in consultation with the Office of Legal Counsel and other Department
lawyers, the Deputy Attorney General and I concluded that the evidence
developed by the Special Counsel is not sufficient to establish that the President
committed an obstruction-of-justice offense.
Although the Deputy Attorney General and I disagreed with some of the
Special Counsel’s legal theories and felt that some of the episodes examined did
not amount to obstruction as a matter of law, we did not rely solely on that in
making our decision. Instead, we accepted the Special Counsel’s legal framework
for purposes of our analysis and evaluated the evidence as presented by the
Special Counsel in reaching our conclusion.
In assessing the President’s actions discussed in the report, it is important to
bear in mind the context. President Trump faced an unprecedented situation. As
he entered into office, and sought to perform his responsibilities as President,
federal agents and prosecutors were scrutinizing his conduct before and after
taking office, and the conduct of some of his associates. At the same time, there
was relentless speculation in the news media about the President’s personal
culpability. Yet, as he said from the beginning, there was in fact no collusion. And
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Clearly, an exhaustive evaluation of the Mueller Report may
present differing views on whether the conduct of President Trump
met the elements of the crime of obstruction of justice.153 This
Article’s examination is more nuanced in that the focus is on
whether underlying conduct is a necessary component for a corrupt
intent for purposes of a criminal obstruction case. In this regard,
data provides observations that counter this contention.
C.

Empirical Analysis of Obstruction Charging Practices

1. Generally
The use of empirical data often comes with caveats, and this
data is no exception. There is no accessible database that provides
complete information on the charging of crimes by the government.
Existing data does not offer information on cases where there were
declinations of prosecutions. There also is no public database to
scrutinize prosecutorial decisions not to include charges such as an
obstruction of justice charge. Further, existing databases do not
provide the pre-charge bargaining that can skew what may have
been considered by prosecutors in selecting a charge of obstruction
or deciding not to charge this conduct. In the early years of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, years in which the judiciary had little
discretion to go outside the mandatory sentencing grid,154 pre-

as the Special Counsel’s report acknowledges, there is substantial evidence to
show that the President was frustrated and angered by a sincere belief that the
investigation was undermining his presidency, propelled by his political
opponents, and fueled by illegal leaks. Nonetheless, the White House fully
cooperated with the Special Counsel’s investigation, providing unfettered access
to campaign and White House documents, directing senior aides to testify freely,
and asserting no privilege claims. And at the same time, the President took no act
that in fact deprived the Special Counsel of the documents and witnesses
necessary to complete his investigation.
Id.

153. See Charlie Savage, How Barr’s Excerpts Compare to the Mueller Report’s Findings,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/19/us/politics/muellerreport-william-barr-excerpts.html (discussing differences in Barr’s response to the Mueller
Report and the Mueller Report itself).
154. See generally Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform:
The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 223
(1993) (discussing the harshness of the sentencing guidelines).
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charge bargaining was commonplace.155 Criminal defense
attorneys would try to secure a plea agreement prior to their client’s
indictment to minimize the repercussions of sentencing. Criminal
defense attorneys still negotiate prior to charging, often to secure
benefits such as a decrease in the sentence for “acceptance of
responsibility”156 or receipt of a sentence reduction based on the
government filing a 5K1.1 motion for the defendant’s cooperation
and assistance to the government.157
Noting the deficiencies in existing databases, there are still
several remaining sources for consideration of actual charges of
obstruction of justice. Three of those sources are used here.
A first method is seen in the TRAC reporting system that
includes separate numerical statistics for federal charging and
convictions of crimes.158 TRAC Reports obtain applicable data from
the Department of Justice and then provide comparisons and
contrasts throughout the years, typically in five-year increments.
The data, however, is limited to the lead charges, so cases with
obstruction of justice counts may be omitted because they might
not have been designated as lead charges by the Department
of Justice.
Second is the wealth of data accessible from the United States
Sentencing Commission. Its available data provides information on
cases that have included obstruction charges, including both the
number of cases, the accompanying charges, and the sentences

155. See generally Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial
Disparity: Assessing the Role of Prosecutors and the Effects of Booker, 123 YALE L.J. 2 (2013)
(noting how pre-charge bargaining can be a limitation to observing sentencing disparities).
156. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 1989).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a decrease in the offense level when a defendant
“clearly demonstrates . . . acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.” Id.
157. Id. § 5K1.1. Section 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allows prosecutors to
file a motion “stating that the defendant has provided substantial assistance in the
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.” Id. The court
then decides the “appropriate reduction” taking into effect factors such as the “the nature
and extent of the defendant’s assistance” and the timeliness of that assistance. Id.
158. “Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) is a data gathering, data
research and data distribution organization at Syracuse University.” About Us,
TRANSACTIONAL RECS. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, https://trac.syr.edu/aboutTRACgeneral.html
(last visited Sept. 11, 2020). TRAC uses the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain
Department of Justice data. Id.
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received.159 Because many of the cases are resolved via a plea
agreement, the data provides the widest range of information.
A key deficiency in this data is that it is basically cold numbers
without reference to specific cases, so that underlying issues cannot
be discerned here.
Finally, a third, more tedious method used is to examine all
reported opinions that include an obstruction of justice statute as a
basis for the charge or where the accused had an obstruction
conviction. The information provided here is significantly more
extensive in that it allows one to consider the underlying conduct
used for the obstruction prosecution. But from another perspective
the sample here is more limited, since most of the obstruction cases
are resolved via plea agreements and thus are seldom the subject of
a reported decision. With so many cases resolved through a plea
agreement, the obstruction appellate issues in these decisions may
focus on the plea, its voluntariness, or whether the accused’s
attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Pre-trial
motions in obstruction cases, along with appellate decisions on
convictions obtained after a trial, do offer some view of what the
charging practices may have been.
Thus, admittedly the data in the sections below is far
from perfect. But the trends and observations with respect to
charging obstruction without other offenses, or with only “shortcut
crimes,” are apparent here and are a constant throughout this
review process.

159. The easily accessible statistics of the U.S. Sentencing Commission report by type
of crime as opposed to focusing just on obstruction offenses. Obstruction offenses come
under Administration of Justice Offenses which include a wider range of conduct well
beyond the statutes in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1501–21. The Commission states that Administration of
Justice Offenses include “obstructing or impeding officers, contempt, obstruction of justice,
perjury or subornation of perjury, bribery of a witness, impersonation, failure to appear by
offender, failure to appear by material witness, commission of offense while on release,
payment of witness, and misprision of a felony.” 2018 Annual Report and Sourcebook, U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N app. A (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/AppendixA.pdf. For fiscal year
2018, there were a total of 730 offenses encompassed under the rubric of “administration of
justice” of which 93.4% (682) were pleas and 6.6 % (48) were trials. Id. tbl.12,
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annualreports-and-sourcebooks/2018/Table12.pdf.
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2. Obstruction charging data
The following chart was developed by using specific lead
charge reports from TRAC. It demonstrates that there has been a
decrease in the number of cases using obstruction of justice as the
lead charge from cases twenty years ago, and that this decrease
is more significant when noting the increased number of
overall cases.
Key Obstruction
Statutes
18 U.S.C. § 1503
18 U.S.C. § 1505
18 U.S.C. § 1510
18 U.S.C. § 1512
18 U.S.C. § 1513
All Federal
Crimes Charged

1999

2009

2014

2019

30
9
8
69
36
89,309

14
5
1
66
25
169,612

7
3
0
52
11
153,207

23
2
1
52
18
184,274

Figure 1: Obstruction as Lead Charge160

Just examining the charging of obstruction under the generic
statute § 1503, it is apparent that the number of prosecutions using
this statute as the lead charge is significantly decreased from
twenty years ago. Although TRAC reports that there has been an
increased number of charges in 2019,161 in this year it demonstrates
a 36.7 percent decrease in § 1503 being the lead charge from twenty
years ago.162 Attributing this decrease to the growth of the newer
obstruction statutes found in 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512 and 1513 is not
warranted, as one finds these two obstruction offenses have also
experienced a decrease.
These statistics do not, however, represent that there has been
an overall decrease in the use of obstruction crimes—these numbers
are merely limited to the Department of Justice’s representation of
what is their lead charge in a case. This is relevant because the

160. This figure was produced by taking the data from each of the individual TRAC
reports of specific statutes presented above. (The author can provide this data.) Reporting is
initially in 5-year increments, but then goes to 10 years as seen above.
161. Figure 1 supra does not report on the difference from 2018 to 2019, but this
percentage is provided in the TRAC Reports. (The author can provide this data.)
162. See supra Figure 1.
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government designation of lead charge can show its emphasis on
different areas of criminal activity. For example, one sees
an increased number of drug and immigration offenses in the
last few years,163 but many of these cases have also included
obstruction charges.
3. Obstruction sentencing data
When one looks at sentencing data that does not designate the
lead charge, a somewhat different picture emerges. Here it becomes
apparent that the government is widely using obstruction charges
and that many convictions include obstruction of justice crimes. It
is also apparent that many of the convictions may be instances of
sole convictions for obstruction conduct without convictions for
any other crimes. The numbers below do not separate convictions
premised upon pleas and trials, so it is possible that some of the
obstruction convictions below resulted from a plea to an
obstruction charge with an accompanying dismissal of other counts
in an indictment. The columns of A1–A4 designate different
obstruction crimes, while columns B, C, and D provide obstruction
with other offenses. Convictions are only listed one time, so the
numbers below represent separate cases and there are no cases that
are placed in multiple boxes on the chart in Figure 2 below.

163. Attorney Generals typically set their priorities upon entering the office.
For example, Attorney General Barr stated that he “support[ed] the prosecutorial priorities
that Attorney General Sessions put in place.” See William P. Barr, Att’y Gen.,
Opening Remarks at the U.S. Attorney’s Conference (June 26, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-william-p-barr-delivers-openingremarks-us-attorneys-conference. Those were “violent crime, drugs, immigration, and
national security.” Id. Other Attorney Generals have had different priorities. For example,
Attorney General Eric Holder had priorities that included “terrorism and other threats to
national security,” violent crimes, financial fraud, and “protecting the most vulnerable
members of our society” (e.g. elderly, victims of hate crimes). See Eric Holder, Att’y Gen.,
Speech on the Department of Justice’s Priorities and Mission (Apr. 25, 2011),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-aboutthedepartment-justice-s-priorities-and-mission.
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Date

A1

A2

A3

A4

B

C

D

Total

2004
2009

16
14

9
5

53
77

15
32

12
8

7
9

86
125

198
270

2014
2018

13
9

4
5

69
66

25
24

12
6

12
9

135
103

270
222

Figure 2: Sentencings with Obstruction Convictions164

• A1: 18 U.S.C. § 1503. The sentences in this column are based on
a violation of the generic obstruction statute, that is, one
against the “due administration of justice.” It is the sole
conviction upon which the defendant is being sentenced,
except for the caveat of accessories and conspiracies
noted below.
• A2: 18 U.S.C. § 1505. The sentences in this column are based on
a violation of the statute “Obstruction of proceedings before
departments, agencies, and committees.” It is the sole
conviction upon which the defendant is being sentenced,
except for the caveat of accessories and conspiracies
noted below.
• A3: 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1513. The sentences in this column
show a combined number for violations of either of these two
statutes that pertain to “Tampering with a witness, victim, or
an informant,” and “Retaliating against a witness, victim, or
an informant.” The number is limited to a sole conviction of
one or both of these obstruction statutes upon which the
defendant is being sentenced, except for the caveat of
accessories and conspiracies noted below. It is also possible
that there might be multiple counts of conviction for different
subsections within either of these statutes.165
• A4. This column represents sentences for convictions of all
other obstruction statutes not listed in A1, A2, and A3, limited
to 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through and including § 1519. It does not
include §§ 1520–21. This column is limited just to obstruction
statutes and does not include sentences that might have been
given for obstructive conduct along with other criminal
164. The choice of years reported here was to replicate as close as possible the five-year
increments seen in the prior data. The dates, however, may not coincide as the entities use
different reporting dates for their year.
165. There can be multiple counts of an obstruction case premised upon different
provisions found in § 1512.
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offenses. If the obstruction conviction includes a multiple of
A1, A2, and A3, it is included in this column, A4, and not
included in A1–A3. Thus, a sentence that might have been
given for a violation of both 18 U.S.C. § 1503 and § 1512 would
be included in this column. Like A1–A3, however, it remains
included here even if there are also convictions as an
accessory or if the defendant has a conspiracy charge along
with the obstruction count.
• B. This column includes sentences for obstruction crimes that
also had sentences of a “shortcut offense.” Thus, it includes
an obstruction offense from 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through and
including § 1519, but also has a conviction for perjury (18
U.S.C. § 1621), false statements (18 U.S.C. § 1001), or false
declarations (18 U.S.C. § 1623). Like A1–A4, however, it
remains included here even if the designation includes a
reference to accessories or has a conspiracy charge along with
these other crimes.
• C. This column includes sentences for an obstruction crime that
also has sentences for key fraud statutes.166 Thus, it includes
an obstruction offense from 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through and
including § 1519, but also has a conviction for mail or wire
fraud, or a fraud statute that is an outgrowth of one of these
statutes.167 Like the prior columns, however, it remains
included here even if the defendant was an accessory or has a
conspiracy charge along with these other crimes.
• D. This column includes sentences of obstruction that also had
sentencing for any other criminal offense that was other than
a “shortcut offense,” a fraud statute, or conspiracy. But if the
obstruction statute had both a “shortcut crime” and a fraud
statute, it would be listed in this column as it includes
multiple charges.

166. Not included here are Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization (RICO)
cases brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1962. A RICO charge could have as its predicate act a fraud
offense, such as mail or wire fraud. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (providing the list of predicate acts
for a “pattern of racketeering” under RICO).
167. Mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, are common
prosecution charges as the statutes are broad and provide significant leeway for charging
many different forms of fraudulent conduct. Additionally, fraud-related statutes have
greatly increased with new fraud offenses for health care fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1347) and
securities and commodities fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1348). All of the fraud-related statutes that
grow from the 1872 mail fraud statute are included in Column C.
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• Total. The total reflects all of the cases involved in these
designated years that included a charge based upon an
obstruction of justice statute from 18 U.S.C. § 1501 through
and including § 1519 in its sentence.

In producing this chart, it is noted that numbers included in
each category omit violations premised on 18 U.S.C. § 2, the federal
statute that allows accessories to be charged as principals.168
The chart also omits cases when there are accompanying
conspiracy charges under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the generic conspiracy
statute in the federal system. Since many of these offenses are
duplicative of the obstruction charge and use the obstruction
charge as the underlying offense, excluding these numbers seemed
warranted. Unlike some states, the federal system allows for
conspiracy to be charged when the specific offense for the
conspiracy statute is the same as the main conduct being charged.169
In comparing the data from Figure 1 and Figure 2 supra, it is
clear that there are a greater number of cases with obstruction
convictions (Figure 2) than there are cases with the government’s
designation of obstruction being the lead charge (Figure 1). It is also
clear that there are many cases with a sole obstruction conviction
without other offenses accompanying the obstruction charge. This
does not necessarily mean that obstruction was the sole charge
168. 18 U.S.C. § 2 states:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels,
commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him
or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as
a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 2. The Sentencing Guidelines do allow for a reduced sentence when an
individual plays a minimal role in the criminal activity and when a defendant is a minor
participant in the criminal activity. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.2 (U.S.
SENT’G COMM’N 1991).
169. 18 U.S.C. § 371 provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner
or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy shall not
exceed the maximum punishment provided for such misdemeanor.
18 U.S.C. § 371. It is possible to have a “conspiracy to defraud” as opposed to a
conspiracy to commit a specific offense that might not include obstruction of justice as
an underlying offense. Id.
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when the accused was initially indicted, as there may be dismissed
charges, perhaps as a result of pleas, or not guilty verdicts, that may
have eliminated other possible conduct.
4. Obstruction court data
Looking directly to the courts allows for closer scrutiny of data.
Unfortunately, however, this examination is limited to cases that
proceeded on appeal or had a reported decision on a pre-trial
matter. This omits all but a narrow range of cases, as the federal
system is predominantly one of pleas, and fewer cases proceed
through the appellate process when the conviction results from a
plea agreement. Also, the number of cases with pre-trial issues that
will have a reported decision are not significant. Thus, the data
provided in Figure 3 infra is a significantly smaller number of cases
than seen in Figure 1 and Figure 2 supra. The information, however,
about the individual cases represented on this chart is greater.
Date
1994
2009
2014
2019

A1
0
2
2
0

A2
0
3
2
0

A3
1
10
18
9

A4
2
9
9
3

B
4
7
8
6

C
0
3
3
4

D
37
119
126
92

Figure 3: Obstruction Counts in Court Opinions170

Examining specific cases as represented by the numbers in
Figure 3, using the same categories used in compiling the data for
Figure 2, confirms the existence of obstruction charges being
brought without any crimes beyond obstruction of justice being
charged. United States v. Solofa171 is an example of a prosecution
exclusively premised on obstruction statutes. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions in
this case under two separate obstruction of justice statutes: witness
tampering under § 1512(b)(3) and the generic obstruction statute
170. Although the categories in Figure 3 remain the same as those in Figure 2, a wider
range of obstruction statutes, namely 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503–21, is used in Figure 3. The two prior
charts also do not coincide as pre-trial data, trial data, and sentencing data may not match in
date ranges. These differences are merely a function of the reporting dates used in compiling
the data and the ability to observe easily the applicable statutes.
171. United States v. Solofa, 745 F.3d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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under § 1503. The defendant’s claim that he did not have a corrupt
intent was rejected at trial, and the convictions were affirmed
on appeal.172
Some cases present obstruction charges along with “shortcut
offenses.” For example, in the 1994 decision of United States v.
DeSalvo,173 one sees the classic charging of four counts of the generic
obstruction statute found in § 1503, along with four counts of
perjury.174 The case involved the defendant testifying three times,
initially in front of a state grand jury, second in front of a federal
grand jury, and finally in court. Immunity, albeit different forms
because of the state and federal immunity laws, was provided on
each occasion. The Second Circuit affirmed the convictions noting
that immunity did not protect a person from perjury charges.175
Although the crux of the decision centered on the scope of
immunity, it should be noted that the statements used in this
prosecution were allowed for meeting both perjury and obstruction
of justice and that beyond these false statements there was no
further underlying conduct that was charged.
When coupled with underlying conduct, as reported in Column
D of Figure 3 supra, one finds a wide array of conduct
accompanying the obstruction charge. For example, there are
obstruction cases that also had immigration,176 money

172. Id. at 1228. The court rejected on appeal a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
premised on counsel not presenting an entrapment defense. Id. at 1230.
173. United States v. DeSalvo, 26 F.3d 1216 (2d Cir. 1994).
174. Although the court uses the term “perjury,” the case actually came under the false
declarations statute found in 18 U.S.C. § 1623.
175. DeSalvo, 26 F.3d at 1220 (citing United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115 (1980)
(allowing indictment for perjury despite immunity)).
176. See United States v. Carriles, 263 F.R.D. 400, 401 (W.D. Tex. 2009) (discussing a
superseding indictment of two counts of perjury, one count of obstruction before an agency
under § 1505, one count of naturalization fraud, and seven counts of false statement in
naturalization proceeding).
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laundering,177 fraud,178 tax,179 and murder charges.180 Obstruction
crimes in these cases stand alongside the underlying conduct
as opposed to it being the sole charge like we see in the cases
in columns A1–A3, and some instances in column A4 of
Figure 3 supra.
5. Summary analysis
What is noteworthy here in looking at all three charts,
Figures 1–3 supra, is that throughout the years, obstruction of justice
has been charged as a sole offense without other charges. We also
see obstruction of justice crimes matched with other “shortcut
offenses.” This correlates with court matters that have found a false
statement in a proceeding to be both perjury and a false declaration,
in addition to being obstruction of justice.
Recent Department of Justice (DOJ) press releases highlight the
use of obstruction of justice as a sole offense against individuals.181
This stance appears to be contrary to the position taken by Attorney
General Barr in response to the Mueller Report, where he discounted
cases brought under obstruction of justice without underlying
conduct being charged. DOJ press releases also highlight the use of
177. See United States v. Farrell, 921 F.3d 116 (4th Cir. 2019) (affirming convictions of a
former attorney for violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1512, money laundering, and conspiracy to
commit money laundering).
178. See United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming the obstruction
of justice count and conspiracy, while reversing the conviction for false registration of a
domain name).
179. See United States v. Williamson, 746 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming an
obstruction case premised on impeding due administration of Internal Revenue laws).
180. See United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010 (11th Cir. 2014) (resentencing
for convictions of obstruction under § 1512(a)(1)(C) and using a firearm for killing a
police officer).
181. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former Caregiver Pleads Guilty to
Obstructing Investigation Related to Violation of Disabled Resident’s Civil Rights
(Feb.
13,
2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-caregiver-pleads-guiltyobstructing-investigation-related-violation-disabled-resident; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of
Just., Massachusetts District Court Judge and Court Officer Indicted for Obstruction of
Justice (Apr. 25, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/massachusetts-district-courtjudge-and-court-officer-indicted-obstruction-justice; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
President of Texas-Based Beverage Company Indicted for Obstruction of Justice
(Oct. 10, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/president-texas-based-beveragecompany-indicted-obstruction-justice; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., University of Kansas
Researcher Indicted for Fraud for Failing to Disclose Conflict of Interest with Chinese
University (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/university-kansasresearcher-indicted-fraud-failing-disclose-conflict-interest-chinese.
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obstruction of justice with other shortcut offenses.182 Likewise,
examining other cases emanating from Special Counsel Robert
Mueller’s investigation demonstrates the use of obstruction charges
as solo offenses,183 coupled with short-cut offenses,184 and alongside
other conduct.185 One need only look at the indictments against
Konstantin Kilimnik, Roger Stone, and Paul Manafort, Jr., to see
the government’s use of these approaches in obstruction of
justice prosecutions.
III. OBSTRUCTION AS A SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT
A.

Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1

In addition to its role as a federal criminal offense, obstruction
of justice also has a unique role in serving as a sentencing
enhancement. In this context, obstruction of justice is not being
considered a crime but rather a basis for raising the accused’s
sentence for specific obstruction conduct.

182. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Oil Tanker Owner, Operator, and Chief
Engineer Convicted for Obstruction of Justice and Concealing Deliberate Pollution
(Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/oil-tanker-owner-operator-and-chiefengineer-convicted-obstruction-justice-and-concealing; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Chicago Area Lawyer Indicted for Perjury and Obstructing Justice (Nov. 25, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chicago-area-lawyer-indicted-perjury-and-obstructingjustice; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Former FBI Linguist Arrested and Indicted on
Obstruction Charges (May 6, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edva/pr/former-fbilinguist-arrested-and-indicted-obstruction-charges; Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just.,
Witness Indicted for False Declarations Before a Grand Jury and Obstruction of Justice
(Aug. 20, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/witness-indicted-false-declarationsgrand-jury-and-obstruction-justice.
183. See Superseding Indictment at 29–30, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-cr-201
(D.D.C. June 8, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/sco/page/file/1070326/download
(charging Kilimnik with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice).
184. See Indictment, United States v. Stone, No. 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1124706/download (charging obstruction of justice under
§§ 1505 and 1512, as well as a false statement charge under 18 U.S.C. § 1001). On July 10,
2020, President Trump issued an executive grant of clemency for Roger Stone, Jr. Press
Release, White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grant of
Clemency for Roger Stone, Jr. (July 10, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-executive-grant-clemency-roger-stone-jr/.
185. See Superseding Criminal Information, United States v. Manafort, No. 1:17-cr-201
(D.D.C. Sept. 14, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1094141/download (including
conspiracy to commit money laundering, tax fraud, conspiracy to obstruct justice (witness
tampering), and other offenses).
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When computing a sentence under the U.S. Sentencing
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines,186 a variety of
different adjustments are considered, such as victim-related
adjustments,187 the accused’s role in the offense,188 whether there
are multiple counts,189 and whether the defendant accepted
responsibility for his or her actions.190 In some instances the
adjustments call for an increased sentence, such as when there is a
hate crime motivation in the act.191 In other instances, such as when
the defendant has a mitigating role in the offense or accepted
responsibility for his or her actions, the adjustments may lower the
sentence level that will be used in computing the sentence using the
sentencing guidelines.192 Part C of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provides four guidelines applicable to obstruction
conduct, all providing a basis for a court to increase a sentence level
for the accused’s conduct. Specifically, Guideline § 3C1.1193 pertains
to “obstructing or impeding the administration of justice.”
As a consideration under the federal sentencing guidelines,
“obstructing or impeding the administration of justice” provides
for an increase in two levels on the sentencing chart if the conduct
fulfils two components:
[i]f (1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or
attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice
with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the
instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct

186. Initially, one computes the base offense level and then determines if adjustments
and departures are necessary. The criminal history of the offender also plays a role in
factoring the sentence. As a result of Supreme Court decisions, the imposition of a sentence
is determined by implementing the language in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. See generally Kate Stith,
The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420
(2008) (discussing the change in sentencing resulting from Supreme Court rulings).
187. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
188. See id. § 3B.
189. See id. § 3D.
190. See id. § 3E.
191. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2010).
192. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
193. See THOMAS W. HUTCHISON, SIGMUND G. POPKO, DEBORAH YOUNG, MICHAEL P.
O’CONNOR & CELIA M. RUMANN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 1024–25 (2020
ed.) (discussing the history of section 3C1.1 of the sentencing guidelines).
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related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any
relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related offense . . . .194

The application notes make clear that “[o]bstructive conduct that
occurred prior to the start of the investigation of the instant offense
of conviction may be covered by this guideline if the conduct was
purposefully calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation or
prosecution of the offense of conviction.”195 The application
provides a long list of conduct that may fall under this sentencing
adjustment, specifically noting that this list is not exhaustive.196
The sentencing guidelines application notes also provide a list
of conduct that ordinarily would not fit the contours for an
increased sentence under this guideline adjustment. In some
instances, one finds conduct that may more appropriately be
194. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
195. Id. at Application Note 1.
196. Id. at Application Note 4. The examples are:
(A) threatening, intimidating, or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant,
witness, or juror, directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so; (B) committing,
suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury, including during the course of a civil
proceeding if such perjury pertains to conduct that forms the basis of the offense
of conviction; (C) producing or attempting to produce a false, altered, or
counterfeit document or record during an official investigation or judicial
proceeding; (D) destroying or concealing or directing or procuring another person
to destroy or conceal evidence that is material to an official investigation or judicial
proceeding (e.g., shredding a document or destroying ledgers upon learning that
an official investigation has commenced or is about to commence), or attempting
to do so; however, if such conduct occurred contemporaneously with arrest (e.g.,
attempting to swallow or throw away a controlled substance), it shall not, standing
alone, be sufficient to warrant an adjustment for obstruction unless it resulted in a
material hindrance to the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense
or the sentencing of the offender; (E) escaping or attempting to escape from
custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully failing to appear, as ordered, for a
judicial proceeding; (F) providing materially false information to a judge or
magistrate judge; (G) providing a materially false statement to a law enforcement
officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or
prosecution of the instant offense; (H) providing materially false information to a
probation officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court;
(I) other conduct prohibited by obstruction of justice provisions under Title 18,
United States Code (e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1510, 1511); (J) failing to comply with a
restraining order or injunction issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e) or with an
order to repatriate property issued pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(p); (K) threatening
the victim of the offense in an attempt to prevent the victim from reporting the
conduct constituting the offense of conviction.
Id. It is also stated that “[t]his adjustment also applies to any other obstructive conduct in
respect to the official investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense where
there is a separate count of conviction for such conduct.” Id.

697

PODGOR.FR (DO NOT DELETE)

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

9/24/20 8:29 PM

46:3 (2021)

covered under other guideline sentencing provisions.197 This
guideline’s application notes also explicitly provide an exclusion
when the defendant is actually being sentenced for an obstruction,
perjury, or contempt crime.198 That said, a typical obstruction
enhancement is seen in cases when the defendant provides false or
perjurious testimony during his or her trial,199 or when someone
threatens a witness who testifies at the trial.
But many issues concerning the application of an obstruction
enhancement to a sentence remain contentious. For example,
circuits have not ruled consistently on whether one who
misrepresents his or her assets on a pre-trial financial affidavit in
order to obtain appointed defense counsel would constitute
sufficient conduct warranting a sentencing enhancement pursuant
to § 3C1.1 of the sentencing guidelines.200 Likewise, although it is
clear that the obstruction sentencing enhancement covers
“attempt” conduct, it remains an open question as to whether
§ 3C1.1 covers attempt conduct when the conduct is not a
significant obstruction of the investigation or when it occurs
through unsworn statements.201 Obstruction as used as a
197. Id. at Application Note 5. The guidelines provide the following non-exhaustive list
of examples that would not be considered the basis for an enhancement premised on
obstruction conduct:
(A) providing a false name or identification document at arrest, except where such
conduct actually resulted in a significant hindrance to the investigation or
prosecution of the instant offense; (B) making false statements, not under oath, to
law enforcement officers, unless Application Note 4(G) above applies;
(C) providing incomplete or misleading information, not amounting to a material
falsehood, in respect to a presentence investigation; (D) avoiding or fleeing from
arrest (see, however, §3C1.2 (Reckless Endangerment During Flight)); (E) lying to a
probation or pretrial services officer about defendant’s drug use while on pre-trial
release, although such conduct may be a factor in determining whether to reduce
the defendant’s sentence under §3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility).
Id.
198. Id. at Application Note 7.
199. See United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87 (1993).
200. See United States v. Iverson, 874 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2017) (joining the majority that
this constitutes obstruction of justice for the purposes of sentencing). But see United States v.
Khimchiachvili, 372 F.3d 75, 80, 82–83 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that when the false statement
only results in obtaining indigent counsel, it is not sufficient for a sentencing enhancement).
201. Application Note 5 to § 3C1.1 appears to exclude the making of “false statements,
not under oath, to law enforcement officers.” U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C.1
Application Note 5 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018). But it also states that this does not apply
when Application Note 4(G) occurs, which is when the defendant “provid[es] a materially
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sentencing enhancement, however, does require materiality.202 The
fact-finding process for using a sentence enhancement has also
proved disconcerting when the accused is accepting a plea as
opposed to going to trial.203 Finally, because the obstruction
conduct is not being charged as a crime, the accused does not
receive all the constitutional benefits accorded in a typical criminal
prosecution, such as the right to “a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury,”204 on the specific conduct outlined in
the enhancement.
It is possible, however, for obstruction to be the crime charged,
with the case also having separate obstruction conduct being
argued as the basis for a sentencing enhancement. For example,
Roger J. Stone, Jr., was convicted of one count of obstructing a
congressional investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1505, five counts of
making numerous false statements to Congress under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(2), and one count of witness tampering under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(1). All of these convictions resulted from his testimony of
September 26, 2017, before the U.S. House of Representatives
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence that was investigating
“allegations of Russian interference in the 2016 presidential
election.”205 In the Government’s initial sentencing memorandum,
it requested a two-level increase in the sentence premised on
false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the
official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” Id. at Application Note 4(G).
Courts have struggled in interpreting these two provisions. See United States v. Slager,
912 F.3d 224, 237–38 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding no error in having the two level sentence
enhancement when the significant statements made to law enforcement were unsworn);
United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (enhancement allowed for significant
obstruction made through attempt conduct). But see United States v. Adejumo, 772 F.3d 513,
529 (8th Cir. 2014) (finding it improper to allow enhancement for attempted obstruction
conduct that was not proven to be significant).
202. See United States v. Buckley, 192 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[A] lie that is
immaterial to the justice process is not a potential interference with it.”); United States v.
Saunders, 359 F.3d 874, 879 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that if the perjury was “on an immaterial
matter, even in court, there would be no obstruction of justice”); see also Podgor, supra note
112, at 597–98 (looking at whether materiality should be an element of obstruction of justice).
203. See generally Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a
World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (discussing how the sentencing enhancement
world fails to adequately account for a criminal justice system that is predominantly pleas).
204. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
205. Government’s Sentencing Memorandum at 1–4, United States v. Stone, No. 1:19cr-18 (D.D.C. Feb. 10, 2020). “[T]he House Intelligence Committee was considering Russian
involvement in obtaining and transmitting stolen documents that were eventually released
by WikiLeaks and any links with the Trump Campaign.” Id. at 4.
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alleged post-indictment obstruction conduct.206 In its second
sentencing memorandum it removed this enhancement stating that
“the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice (§ 3C1.1)
overlaps to a degree with the offense conduct in this case.”207 Thus,
although one had obstruction of justice as a crime, the government
changed its position in the two sentencing memorandums from
initially saying the obstruction conduct after the filing of the
charges differed from the charged conduct and therefore could be
the basis of a sentencing enhancement, to later saying it should not
be used this way.
B.

Statistical Use of Guideline § 3C1.1

Sentencing enhancements for obstruction conduct under
§ 3C1.1 are not significantly used by courts in comparison to the
total number of individuals sentenced. The chart below provides a
sampling of the number of cases where the offender received a
sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice, in comparison to
the number of cases with no such sentencing enhancement. It also
provides the percentages for the applicable years.

206. The government argued that “[s]hortly after the case was indicted, Stone posted
an image of the presiding judge with a crosshair next to her head.” Id. at 18. There were also
allegations of violations of a “court order by posting messages on social media about matters
related to the case.” Id.
207. Government’s Supplemental and Amended Sentencing Memorandum at 3, United
States v. Stone, No. 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2020). This new Memorandum also stated that
“[m]oreover, it is unclear to what extent the defendant’s obstructive conduct actually
prejudiced the government at trial.” Id. at 3–4. The filing of an amended government
sentencing memorandum proved to be highly controversial. See Matt Zapotosky, Devlin
Barrett, Ann E. Marimow & Spencer S. Hsu, Prosecutors Quit amid Escalating Justice Dept.
Fight over Roger Stone’s Prison Term, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2020, 6:44 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/justice-dept-to-reduce-sentencingrecommendation-for-trump-associate-roger-stone-official-says-after-president-calls-itunfair/2020/02/11/ad81fd36-4cf0-11ea-bf44-f5043eb3918a_story.html. On July 10, 2020,
President Trump issued an executive grant of clemency for Roger Stone, Jr. Press Release,
White House, Statement from the Press Secretary Regarding Executive Grant of Clemency
for Roger Stone, Jr. (July 10, 2020), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-press-secretary-regarding-executive-grant-clemency-roger-stone-jr/.
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Offender
Obstructed
Justice
1,319
1,404
1,614
1,469
1,666
1,681

Offender Did
Not Obstruct
Justice
60,588
66,247
69, 405
41,115
46,354
32,961

Percentage of
Offender
Obstruction
2.1
2.1
2.3
3.4
3.5
4.9

Percentage of
No Offender
Obstruction
97.9
97.9
97.7
96.6
96.5
95.1

Figure 4: Obstruction as a Sentencing Enhancement208

Examining this chart in Figure 4, it is apparent that over time
there has been a percentage decrease in the use of obstruction as a
sentencing option. The change from 4.9% in 1994 to 2.1% in 2017
demonstrates this decrease in cases where a court used the § 3C1.1
enhancement in sentencing a convicted defendant.
C.

Contrasted with Obstruction as a Crime

When contrasting obstruction of justice as a federal crime with
its use as a sentencing factor, several points are important here.
First is that although a prosecutor may argue for an obstruction
enhancement, the probation department has an equal voice in
offering the judge its opinion on whether the sentence should be
increased due to obstruction conduct. Likewise, the defense is a key

208. From 1996 and thereafter the figures are a part of Table 18 of the Annual Sourcebook
of Federal Sentencing Statistics, although the included timeframe may have differed in some
years. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS S-44
tbl.18 (2017), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2017/Table18.pdf; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2014 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2014), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/
pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2014/Table18.pdf;
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2009 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2009),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/2009/Table18_0.pdf; U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2004 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (2004), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/
research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2004/table18pre_0.pdf;
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 1999 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.18 (1999),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/1999/table18_0.pdf. Prior to 1996, the numbers are a part of the Annual
Reports for each year. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 68–69 tbl.25 (1994),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reportsand-sourcebooks/1994/1994%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
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player in the process and may file a sentencing memorandum as to
why this enhancement might be inapplicable for their client.
A judge makes the ultimate decision.
Thus, prosecutors do not have an increased or superior role in
the sentencing context. Unlike the government’s unique ability to
charge a defendant with a federal crime, select the crimes to be
prosecuted, offer plea benefits of their choosing, and dismiss counts
of an indictment, sentencing of the defendant does not provide the
government with this sole discretion. When it comes to sentencing
enhancements, such as the enhancement for obstruction conduct,
multiple players may be influential in the decision of whether to
increase the base level of the offense.
Second, it should be noted that obstruction as a sentencing
enhancement is seldom a negotiating point between the
prosecution and defense in a plea agreement. The conduct in
question may be a function of a defendant lying on the witness
stand or intimidating or harassing witnesses209 during the trial.210
This is particularly true because obstruction conduct typically
happens surrounding the trial, as opposed to being a part of the
crime charged. Thus, this sentencing enhancement is unlikely to be
included in the plea negotiations. This is unlike sentencing
mitigators such as the accused’s “acceptance of responsibility,”
where the government’s plea negotiation may offer this reduction
in sentence as a carrot for the accused to accept the plea. As 97.4%
of cases in the federal system are resolved via a plea agreement,211
not having this sentencing enhancement as a part of the negotiation
limits its role as an influencing factor. The greatest role § 3C1.1 may
have will be in deciding whether a defendant will testify at his or
her trial. Testifying falsely can open the defendant to this
sentencing enhancement.
When the obstruction conduct is encompassed within the
crime, the prosecutor has the ability to include it as a count in the
209. It is possible that the prosecutor could add charges under §§ 1512 or 1513 of
Title 18 for intimidating or retaliating against a witness.
210. The prosecutor would have the option of including this as a federal crime, but if
the case has already started, it is more likely that the conduct will be used to increase the
sentence as opposed to presenting it as part of the initial indictment or through a
superseding indictment.
211. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2018 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 56
tbl.11 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/
annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2018/Table11.pdf.
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criminal indictment against the accused. Alternatively, the
government may amend the indictment to add obstruction
conduct, thus removing it from being a sentencing enhancement.
Third, it is important to note that although sentencing
enhancements can be subject to inconsistencies, there is the
appellate remedy available to both the convicted individual and the
government if either party believes that the judge did not correctly
assess the sentence. From the defense perspective, an increased
sentence for obstruction conduct would not be lost in a selective
prosecution claim, one with an enormous burden on the defense
and one that is seldom successful.212 Since it is not a part of the
charging of the crime, there is equal ability to contest a judge’s use
of this factor in increasing or not increasing a sentence for
obstruction conduct. Because the U.S. Sentencing Commission
compiles extensive statistical data, transparency is provided to
review consistency in the use of sentencing factor § 3C1.1.213
Finally, because the government can proceed with a criminal
charge for obstruction conduct related to the trial and avoid its
consideration as merely a sentencing enhancement, the
government retains discretion in how they will proceed when there
is obstruction conduct related to the defendant. As noted, if the
obstruction conduct occurs during the trial, it is unlikely that the
government will file new charges against the accused. But it is
important to note that they do have this discretion.
IV. OBSTRUCTION AS AN ARTICLE OF IMPEACHMENT
A.

Generally

Of the twenty federal impeachments,214 only the impeachments
of Presidents Clinton and Trump explicitly include obstruction as
212. See United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382–84 (1982) (placing a high burden
on the defense to show that the prosecutor’s charging decision was motivated by an
improper purpose); see also Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and
the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393 (2001) (discussing prosecutorial discretion
in charging).
213. The Sentencing Commission issues annual reports that include information
pertaining to each guideline within the federal sentencing guidelines.
214. These impeachments were: William Blount (Senator), John Pickering (District
Judge), Samuel Chase (Supreme Court Justice); James H. Peck (District Judge), West
Humphreys (District Judge), Andrew Johnson (President), Mark Delahey (District Judge),
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an article of impeachment.215 Obstruction of justice was considered
in some impeachment investigations, but these impeachments did
not come to fruition,216 such as the investigation of President
Richard M. Nixon who resigned prior to articles of impeachment
being voted upon by the House of Representatives.217 Several
judicial impeachments include allegations of perjury or false
testimony. The articles of impeachment in these instances do not
include explicit allegations of obstruction of justice.218 This is
noteworthy, however, because prosecutors often charge

William Belknap (Secretary of War), Charles Swayne (District Judge), Robert Archbald
(Commerce Court Judge), George W. English (District Judge), Harold Louderback (District
Judge), Halsted Ritter (District Judge), Harry Claiborne (District Judge), Alcee Hastings
(District Judge), Walter Nixon (District Judge), William Jefferson Clinton (President), Samuel
Kent (District Judge), Thomas Porteous (District Judge), Donald J. Trump (President).
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, IMPEACHMENT: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 201–03 (2018)
(providing an appendix of the federal impeachments up through 2010).
215. See infra notes 225–41.
216. See 3 ASHER C. HINDS, Impeachment Proceedings Not Resulting in Trial, in HINDS’
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES 981, 981–1034 (1907),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3/pdf/GPO-HPRECHINDS-V3-28.pdf.
217. In the case of Former President Richard Nixon, an impeachment investigation by
the Judiciary Committee had been authorized by the House. See H.R. Res. 803,
93d Cong. (1974), https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-congress/house-resolution/803.
The committee voted three articles of impeachment for consideration by the House, but they
were not presented because of his resignation. Two of the three Articles could be considered
allegations of obstructive forms of conduct. Article One included language alleging that the
President “committed unlawful entry of the” Democratic Headquarters in using his powers
“personally and through his subordinates and agents, in a course of conduct or plan
designed to delay, impede, and obstruct the investigation of such unlawful entry; to cover
up . . . and to conceal the existence and scope of other unlawful covert activities.” See COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, IMPEACHMENT OF RICHARD M. NIXON PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. REP. NO. 93-1305, at 2, 4 (1974), https://www.justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/ukraine-clearinghouse-house-rep.-93-1305.pdf. Nine specific
acts are then alleged. Id. Article Three concerned the alleged refusal to produce certain
materials to Congress. Id.
218. For example, the three articles of impeachment against Judge Walter L. Nixon, Jr.,
reference the making of false material statements to a grand jury and concealing information
to the grand jury, but there are no explicit statements of this being an obstruction of justice.
See IMPEACHMENT OF WALTER L. NIXON, JR. (1989), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc3/pdf/GPO-CDOC-106sdoc3-19-6.pdf. Likewise, the four articles
of impeachment against Judge G. Thomas Porteous, Jr., include corruption and perjury, but
no mention of obstruction of justice. See Bruce Alpert, Judge Thomas Porteous: Summary of 4
Articles of Impeachment Approved, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 11, 2010, 10:41 PM),
https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_fba1b03d-0784-5e16-8e4da5df7706d2fe.html.
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obstruction of justice in federal criminal cases based upon false
statements,219 false declarations,220 or perjury.221
Two impeachments were premised upon judicial use and
alleged misuse of contempt powers, an early form of obstruction of
justice. These impeachments involved Judge James H. Peck in
1830,222 previously discussed as his impeachment was the impetus
for the initial obstruction statute, and Judge Charles Swayne, a
federal district court judge for the Northern District of Florida who
faced impeachment in 1905.223 Both of these judges were accused of
improperly issuing contempt orders and faced impeachment for
this alleged judicial misconduct.224 Both were acquitted following
their impeachment trials. In each of these cases, the alleged
obstruction of justice was not being done by the judicial officer, but
219. See United States v. Barfield, 999 F.2d 1520, 1524–25 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that a
government informant had obstructed justice by making false statements to an attorney).
220. See United States v. Langella, 776 F.2d 1078, 1078 (2d Cir. 1985) (charging both false
declarations and obstruction for false testimony to a grand jury).
221. See United States v. Bonanno, 177 F. Supp. 106, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (charging both
perjury and obstruction of justice for an agreement to frustrate a grand jury using “evasion,
silence or lies”).
222. See supra notes 27–36 and accompanying text.
223. In several ways Judge Swayne’s case mirrors that of Judge Peck as one of the
Articles related to his “[h]aving imprisoned and fined certain lawyers in his District and
certain citizens therein without authority of law upon an alleged contempt proceeding.”
E. Hilton Jackson, The Swayne Impeachment Proceedings, 10 VA. L. REG. 1071, 1072 (1905)
(providing a summary of the articles of impeachment). The judge was alleged to have
“negotiate[ed] with a real estate agent in” Florida for land that was in litigation in his court.
Id. at 1075. Thereafter the two attorneys involved in the land case dismissed the suit in Judge
Swayne’s court and began litigation in the state courts of Florida. Judge Swayne believed
that the filing of this suit was an attempt to force him to recuse himself so that the attorneys
could obtain a new judge. In response to the attorneys’ actions, Judge Swayne sentenced the
two lawyers to imprisonment, a fine, and two years disbarment. The case against the
attorneys was thereafter reversed by the Northern District of Florida. But the conduct ended
up being a key component in this 1905 impeachment action against the judge. Id.; see also
ASHER C. HINDS, The Impeachment and Trial of Charles Swayne, in HINDS’ PRECEDENTS supra
note 216, at 948, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDSV3/html/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3-27.htm. The article of impeachment was considered the
most serious of the charges and involved allegations that he imposed an “illegal and
arbitrary” sentence on two Florida lawyers. Jackson, supra, at 1075.
224. In Judge Swayne’s 1905 impeachment trial it was argued that “no officer can be
impeached except for indictable offenses, and that, as there are no common law offenses
against the United States, it follows that there can be no impeachment except for an offense
expressly declared and made indictable by Act of Congress.” Jackson, supra note 223, at 1077.
The discussion, however, went on to note that this “construction would of course render the
constitutional provision affecting impeachments a practical nullity, for Congress has defined
and made indictable by statute comparatively few offenses.” Id.
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rather by an attorney appearing before the judges. The judges’
response to the activities of these attorneys was to issue a finding
of contempt against the lawyers. These cases, therefore, differ from
the discussion in this Part.225
First, the articles of impeachment do not coincide with the
current obstruction statutes, but rather with its predecessor
contempt offense that was initially combined with obstruction
outside the courtroom in a unitary offense. This form of contempt
is not currently in the federal criminal obstruction statutes, but
instead located in a separate contempt statute that is removed from
all the typical obstruction crimes found in chapter 73 of Title 18.
Second, the impeachments of both Judge Peck and Judge Swayne
do not use obstruction of justice as the basis for the impeachment,
but rather have the contempt matter being used by them against
another party. Thus, for purposes of this Article they are not
considered in the comparison of impeachment premised on
obstruction and federal criminal law obstruction crimes.
Two of the three presidential impeachments,226 however, are
considered here, as obstruction conduct was explicitly stated as one
of the articles of impeachment in each of these cases.227
225. Impeachments that involve other forms of courtroom misconduct by a judicial
officer differ from the obstruction of justice conduct being considered here. For example, a
prior impeachment involved United States Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase who was
impeached on eight articles of impeachment that focused on his courtroom conduct that was
alleged to be “arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust.” ASHER C. HINDS, The Impeachment and Trial
of Samuel Chase, in HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra note 216, at 711, 722,
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPREC-HINDS-V3/html/GPO-HPRECHINDS-V3-21.htm. He was acquitted following a failure to secure a 2/3 vote on any of the
articles of impeachment. Id. at 770.
226. See generally JON MEACHAM, TIMOTHY NAFTALI, PETER BAKER & JEFFREY A. ENGEL,
IMPEACHMENT: AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2018) (discussing the impeachments of Andrew
Johnson, Richard Nixon, and Bill Clinton).
227. In the case of Andrew Johnson, the first U.S. President to face impeachment, the
eleven articles of impeachment alleged conduct that might today fit under an obstruction of
justice statute. But he was not charged at that time with statements of obstructing the due
administration of justice. Yet, allegations of intimidation, as noted below, would fit current
obstructive activities. For example, Article IV of Articles of Impeachment against President
Andrew Johnson was:
That said Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, unmindful of the high
duties of his office and of his oath of office, in violation of the Constitution and
laws of the United States, on the twenty-first day of February, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-eight, at Washington, in the District
of Columbia, did unlawfully conspire with one Lorenzo Thomas, and with other
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The impeachments of Presidents William Jefferson Clinton and
Donald J. Trump both included obstruction of justice in the articles
of impeachment.228 As with many of the other impeachment trials
in the history of the United States, both also resulted in
an acquittal.229
As one might suspect, many issues surround impeachments,230
especially presidential impeachments. These include what
constitutes a “high crime and misdemeanor,”231 whether a criminal
act is required,232 whether presidential immunity precludes the
persons to the House of Representatives unknown, with intent, by intimidation
and threats, unlawfully to hinder and prevent Edwin M. Stanton, then and there
Secretary for the Department of War, duly appointed under the laws of the United
States, from holding said office of Secretary for the Department of War, contrary
to and in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and of the provisions
of an act entitled “An act to define and punish certain conspiracies,” approved July
thirty-first, eighteen hundred and sixty-one, whereby said Andrew Johnson,
President of the United States, did then and there commit and was guilty of a high
crime in office.
Article IV, The Articles of Impeachment, Andrew Johnson–National Historic Site Tennessee, NAT’L
PARK SERV. (Mar. 7, 1868), https://www.nps.gov/anjo/learn/historyculture/the-articlesof-impeachment.htm.
228. See IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED
STATES, H.R. REP. NO. 105-830 (1998), https://www.congress.gov/105/crpt/hrpt830/CRPT105hrpt830.pdf; Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high
crimes and misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong., at 6 (2019) (enacted),
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/6572344-Articles-of-Impeachment1.html#document/p1.
229. William Clinton was acquitted on February 12, 1999. President Bill Clinton Acquitted
on Both Articles of Impeachment, HISTORY (Feb. 9, 2010), https://www.history.com/this-dayin-history/president-clinton-acquitted. Donald Trump was acquitted on February 5, 2020.
Peter Baker, Impeachment Trial Updates: Senate Acquits Trump, Ending Historic Trial,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/05/us/politics/
impeachment-vote.html.
230. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, IMPEACHMENT: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE (2017)
(discussing a historical overview of impeachment and the many accompanying issues);
see also GERHARDT, supra note 214 (discussing a wide array of background on the procedures
and issues arising in impeachment cases).
231. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Defining “High Crimes and Misdemeanors”: Basic
Principles, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (1999) (discussing what constitutes a “high crime and
misdemeanor” for purposes of impeachment).
232. See CHARLES L. BLACK, JR. & PHILIP BOBBITT, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 107–09
(2018) (noting that it is a fallacy to claim that a criminal act is required for a presidential
impeachment). The authors use as one of their examples of why a crime is not a necessary
component of an impeachment—“[w]hat if the president required that all cabinet members
affirm their belief in the divinity of Christ?” Id. at 108–09; see also MAJORITY STAFF
OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS
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impeachment of a president for presidential office–related
activities,233 the applicable standards to be used for a conviction of
an impeachment, and whether exhaustion of all remedies is
necessary prior to proceeding with an obstruction allegation.
Although these issues are significant to impeachment matters, they
are for the most part beyond this discussion.234
This next Section looks at obstruction of justice as alleged in the
articles of impeachment and trials of Presidents Clinton and
Trump. Following these two subsections, the Article specifically
examines the structural differences between obstruction of justice
used as the basis for an impeachment and its use as a federal
criminal offense or as a sentencing enhancement. It is the contrast
to the federal crime and sentencing enhancement that is the crux of
this next Section. Thus, this discussion examines obstruction
conduct for purposes of impeachment from the perspective of the
obstructive acts used as charges for impeachment and the process
in evaluating this specific conduct.
B.

Obstruction as an Article of Impeachment

1. President William Jefferson Clinton
The events leading up to the impeachment of President Bill
Clinton concerned his sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky,
a White House intern, which came to light during a civil lawsuit
filed against him during his presidency. Paula Jones, who had been

PRESIDENTIAL
IMPEACHMENT
(2019),
https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/
democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/hcm%20final%20v.3.pdf. But recently in
the Senate hearing on the impeachment of Donald J. Trump, Professor Alan Dershowitz
argued that “criminal-like conduct akin to treason and bribery” was a necessary component
for a guilty finding of impeachment. Alan Dershowitz Defense Argument Transcript: Trump
Impeachment
Trial
January 27,
REV: BLOG,
at 15:27 (Jan.
28, 2020),
https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/alan-dershowitz-defense-argument-transcripttrump-impeachment-trial-january-27.
233. See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Eric A. Posner, Presidential Obstruction of Justice, 106
CALIF. L. REV. 1277 (2018) (discussing the need to consider how “criminal law can be
harmonized with the president’s constitutional responsibilities”); Neal Kumar Katyal,
Impeachment as Congressional Constitutional Interpretation, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
169 (2000) (looking at how the legislature in impeachment hearings is making
constitutional decisions).
234. See Roman et al., supra note 139, at 37–46 (discussing the conclusion of Robert
Mueller, the Department of Justice, and others on whether a sitting President can be
criminally indicted).
FOR
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an employee of the Arkansas Development Commission and had
worked for Clinton when he was governor, filed a sexual
harassment lawsuit against him.235 Clinton’s attempt to claim
immunity during his presidency was rejected by the Supreme
Court,236 with the Court holding that the doctrine of separation of
powers does not require federal courts to stay all private actions
against the President until he leaves office. On remand to the
Arkansas District Court, the court states, “What began as a civil
lawsuit against the President of the United States for alleged sexual
harassment eventually resulted in an impeachment trial of
the President.”237
Although there are mountains of materials that provide the
details of the matter, a synopsis would include that the lawyers for
Paula Jones, learning of a relationship between President Clinton
and Monica Lewinsky, questioned him on this conduct during his
deposition.238 In August 1998, the President also appeared before a
grand jury as part of an Office of Independent Counsel (Starr)
Investigation, an investigation that had expanded to cover conduct
well beyond its initial scope.239 The net result was that Kenneth W.
Starr, Independent Counsel, eventually referred the matter to the
House of Representatives with a listing of eleven possible “[a]cts
[t]hat [m]ay [c]onstitute [g]rounds for an [i]mpeachment.”240
235. GERHARDT, supra note 214, at 35.
236. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 681–82 (1997). One of the arguments raised by
Clinton was “that this particular case—as well as the potential additional litigation that an
affirmance of the Court of Appeals judgment might spawn—may impose an unacceptable
burden on the President’s time and energy, and thereby impair the effective performance of
his office.” Id. at 701–02. The Court also rejected his argument regarding separation of
powers. Id. at 705–06.
237. Jones v. Clinton, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1120 (E.D. Ark. 1999).
238. Id. at 1121–22 (discussing the extensiveness of the questioning and his responses).
239. See id. at 1123.
240. COMMUNICATION FROM KENNETH W. STARR, INDEPENDENT COUNSEL,
H.R. DOC. NO. 105-310, at 129 (1998), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC105hdoc310/pdf/CDOC-105hdoc310.pdf. The conclusion of Starr’s Report stated:
In this case, the President made and caused to be made false statements to the
American people about his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. He also made false
statements about whether he had lied under oath or otherwise obstructed justice
in his civil case. By publicly and emphatically stating in January 1998 that ‘‘I did
not have sexual relations with that woman’’ and these ‘‘allegations are false,’’ the
President also effectively delayed a possible congressional inquiry, and then he
further delayed it by asserting Executive Privilege and refusing to testify for six
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The U.S. House of Representatives considered four articles of
impeachment with eventually two articles being transmitted to the
Senate for trial.241 The two articles approved by the House alleged
that the President “provided perjurious, false and misleading
testimony to the grand jury regarding the Paula Jones case and his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky,” and that he “obstructed
justice in an effort to delay, impede, cover up and conceal the
existence of evidence related to the Jones case.”242 The specific
conduct that was the essence of the obstruction article was
described as “[e]ncouraging Lewinsky to file a false affidavit,”
“[e]ncouraging Lewinsky to give false testimony if called to
appear,” “[e]ncouraging Lewinsky to hide gifts,” “[g]etting
Lewinsky a job to ensure her silence,” “[l]etting [Robert S. Bennett,
Clinton’s attorney,] make false and misleading statements,”
“[t]ampering with the testimony of Currie, a potential witness,”
and “[l]ying to aides about his relationship with Lewinsky when he
knew they were potential grand jury witnesses who would repeat
the falsehoods before the grand jury.”243 Following a five-week trial
in the Senate, President Clinton was acquitted of both articles
of impeachment.244
2. President Donald J. Trump
The trajectory of the Trump Impeachment differs in large part
from the Clinton Impeachment because the acts of impeachment
were not items transmitted to the U.S. House of Representatives
from the Mueller Investigation. On May 17, 2017, Acting Attorney
General Rod Rosenstein issued an order appointing a special
months during the Independent Counsel investigation. This represents substantial
and credible information that may constitute grounds for an impeachment.
Id. at 210.
241. The House Committee on the Judiciary Report had four articles of impeachment.
See IMPEACHMENT OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON, supra note 228.
242. See Approved Articles of Impeachment, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles122098.htm.
243. Ruth Marcus, The Articles Explained, WASH. POST (Dec. 18, 1998),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/clinton/stories/articles121898.htm.
244. President Bill Clinton Acquitted on Both Articles of Impeachment, supra note 229.
A transcript of the hearing on Article III demonstrates that witness tampering, false
statements, and a false affidavit were the heart of the testimony and discussion. See Federal
News Service, The Impeachment Hearings: Dec. 11: Debate and Vote on Article III,
WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/
clinton/stories/articleiii121198.htm.
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counsel to investigate Russian interference with the 2016
Presidential election.245 Indictments and convictions against a host
of different individuals, many associated with the President, were
an outgrowth of the Mueller Investigation.246 The Mueller Report,
however, did not serve as the basis of the impeachment of President
Trump, although information from the Report was used by the
House Managers during the Impeachment trial.247
The impeachment of President Donald J. Trump revolved
around whether he had solicited foreign assistance from the
Ukrainian government to secure information about one of his
political rivals in the upcoming election, including his withholding
aid to this country. The House Investigation included testimony
from some key members from the State Department, a
whistleblower complaint that offered inside information
concerning a telephone call between President Trump and
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky, and other information
provided during a variety of congressional hearings.248
Two articles of impeachment against President Trump were the
eventual result of the House consideration of ongoing matters.
Article I focused on allegations that the President abused his power.
It is Article II that contains alleged obstruction conduct in charging
him with obstruction of Congress for “blocking testimony and
refusing to provide documents in response to House subpoenas in
the impeachment inquiry.”249 At the Senate trial there were issues

245. Appointment of Special Counsel, DEP’T OF JUST. (May 17, 2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/appointment-special-counsel.
246. See, e.g., Indictment, United States v. Stone, No. 1:19-cr-18 (D.D.C. Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/file/1124706/download; Plea Agreement, United States v. Cohen,
No. 1:18-cr-850 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1115566/download.
247. See MUELLER REPORT VOL. I, supra note 142; MUELLER REPORT VOL. II,
supra note 65; Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States,
for high crimes and misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-resolution/755/text.
248. Read the Articles of Impeachment Against President Trump, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/10/us/politics/articles-impeachmentdocument-pdf.html.
249. Id. Article II explicitly states that
without lawful cause or excuse, President Trump directed Executive Branch
agencies, offices, and officials not to comply with those subpoenas. President
Trump thus interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas
of the House of Representatives, and assumed to himself functions and judgments
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raised, including whether there was a quid pro quo, whether a
criminal act was required for an impeachment conviction, whether
the president had done anything improper,250 and whether the
impeachment was brought with a political motive. One of the key
points in the Senate trial was whether additional witnesses could
be called, most notably the former National Security Advisor John
Bolton,251 and whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain an
impeachment conviction. The House managers lost both issues
and the impeachment trial ended with an acquittal for
President Trump.252
C.

Contrasted with Obstruction as a Crime
and Sentencing Enhancement

In looking at how impeachment premised on obstruction differs
from obstruction as a federal crime and as a sentencing
enhancement, the most obvious differences rest in the procedure
being used to proceed with the charges, the ability of parties to
present comparable evidence as one would at a criminal trial, and
the constituencies that review the evidence. Less clear is the
standard of proof needed for an impeachment. Conduct that
might fit a specific criminal statute might prove insufficient for
conviction in an impeachment matter. Some may claim that the
political context for consideration of impeachment charges is a
crucial difference.
Unlike federal statutes that outline the basis for criminal
charges, or Sentencing Guideline § 3C1.1, which provides an
enhancement for obstruction conduct, the source for impeachment
is the U.S. Constitution, which has four provisions related to
necessary to the exercise of the “sole Power of Impeachment” vested by the
Constitution in the House of Representatives.
Impeaching Donald John Trump, H.R. Res. 755. This Article of Impeachment then provides
the specific acts that are claimed as an abuse of President Trump’s “powers in the
high office.” Id.
250. See Molly O’Toole, Trump’s Impeachment Counteroffensive Undercut by Bolton Report
Bolstering
Call
for
Witnesses,
L.A. TIMES
(Jan.
26,
2020,
7:23
PM),
https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-01-26/whos-on-trial-trumps-defense-teamturns-impeachment-into-counteroffensive.
251. See Li Zhou, Trump’s Defense in the Impeachment Trial Just Wrapped. Here Are 6 Key
Moments,
VOX
(Jan. 28, 2020, 6:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/
28/21110795/trump-defense-impeachment-trial-ken-starr-alan-dershowitz.
252. Baker, supra note 229.
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impeachment.253 The process with House Managers from the
House of Representatives, who then present the case for trial in the
Senate, does not come with Federal Rules of Procedure and instead
is governed only by agreements of the parties based upon prior
impeachments.254 Unlike courts, which have precedent to rely on,
impeachment procedure is fluid and not binding in large part
because the constitutional language provides only a high-level
overview of the process, and impeachment proceedings are few
and far between. There can be strong disagreements, such as most
recently seen in the impeachment trial against President Trump
when the Senate voted not to hear witnesses that the trial managers
wanted to present.255
It has continually been noted that a violation of a criminal
statute is not imperative for an impeachment conviction. Although
Alan Dershowitz, in the recent impeachment of President Trump,
argued otherwise with regard to the first Article of Impeachment,
which was premised on “abuse of power,” the long-standing
position has been that a President can commit “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” without violating the criminal law.256 That said, in

253. One finds the following constitutional provisions related to impeachment: The
Constitution states that “[t]he House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other
Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. It also
states that:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for
that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the
United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two-thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit
under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Id. art. I, § 3, cls. 6–7. Article II, § 2 provides that “[t]he President . . . shall have Power to
grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Finally, Article II, § 4 states that “[t]he President, Vice
President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors. Id. art. II, § 4.
254. See DOUG COLLINS, MODERN PRECEDENT ON IMPEACHMENT PROCEDURE:
IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS FOR PRESIDENTS RICHARD NIXON AND BILL CLINTON (2019),
https://conaway.house.gov/uploadedfiles/modern_precedent_on_impeachment_proced
ure_-_ranking_member_report.pdf.
255. See Zhou, supra note 251.
256. See MAJORITY STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 116TH CONG.,
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 1 (2019).
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both the Impeachments of Presidents Clinton and Trump, there
were existing federal obstruction crimes that easily could be
matched with the charges against them. In the case of President
Clinton, claims that he “obstructed justice in an effort to delay,
impede, cover up and conceal the existence of evidence related to
the Jones case”257 would merit consideration under 18 U.S.C. § 1503.
Likewise, claims of perjury could also be prosecuted under this
statute. In the Impeachment of President Trump, Article II’s claims
that he obstructed Congress for “blocking testimony and refusing
to provide documents in response to House subpoenas in the
impeachment inquiry,”258 would fit consideration under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1505, “[o]bstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies,
and committees.” Clearly there would be defenses that can be
associated with each of these criminal statutes, but the wording of
the Articles of Impeachment correlate to these federal statutes. The
acquittals in both cases do not negate whether the language in the
Articles of Impeachment correlate to obstruction statutes in the
federal system.
The Impeachment process, despite resting on obstructionrelated conduct in some cases, is very different from that of a
criminal process that affords a codified scheme for witness
testimony, a somewhat clearer base for finding criminality, and an
appellate process for review. Arguably one can say that
impeachments carry a review by the electorate in future
presidential, House, and Senate elections, but this is limited to
impeachments of elected officials who have upcoming elections.
Although outside the legal structure and hardly a typical appellate
process, elections provide a reaction to an impeachment result,

257. See Approved Articles of Impeachment, supra note 235.
258. See Read the Articles of Impeachment Against President Trump, supra note 248. Article
II explicitly states that
without lawful cause or excuse, President Trump directed Executive Branch
agencies, offices, and officials not to comply with those subpoenas. President
Trump thus interposed the powers of the Presidency against the lawful subpoenas
of the House of Representatives, and assumed to himself functions and
judgements necessary to the exercise of the “sole Power of Impeachment” vested
by the Constitution in the House of Representatives.
Impeaching Donald John Trump, President of the United States, for high crimes and
misdemeanors, H.R. Res. 755, 116th Cong. (2019) (enacted).
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albeit not necessarily focused on the alleged conduct that was the
subject of review in the impeachment process.259
CONCLUSION
It is likely that overcriminalization and overfederalization have
played a role in providing increased discretion to prosecutors to
proceed against obstruction conduct.260 What was initially one
federal statute has become an array of different obstruction statutes
allowing prosecutors flexibility in their charging practices.
Professor John F. Decker has written on ways to “[r]estrict[]
the [b]oundaries” of what will constitute obstruction of justice,
such as requiring an increased intent or limiting the range of
conduct.261 The focus here is not on curtailing the legislation or
its interpretation by courts, although these remedies would
certainly assist. Rather, what is considered here is how to
achieve a fair and just system that provides consistency and
thus predictability.
One has to ask whether discretion should be in the hands of a
sole individual. Should Attorney General Barr read the Mueller
Report and be able to conclude that the conduct alleged in the report
should not be charged as obstruction?262 Does the fact that his office
charges obstruction of justice without underlying conduct in other
cases demonstrate a contradiction? Even after his pronouncement
following the Mueller Report, his office continued to charge
obstruction of justice as an exclusive charge.263
259. This, of course, would be inapplicable for judicial impeachments, where the judge
may continue a lifetime appointment if he or she is not convicted in the impeachment trial.
260. See Brian W. Walsh & Tiffany M. Joslyn, Without Intent: How Congress Is Eroding the
Criminal Intent Requirement in Federal Law, HERITAGE FOUND. & NAT’L ASS’N OF
CRIM. DEF. LAWS. (2010), https://www.nacdl.org/getattachment/8d5312e0-70f8-4007-84350ab703dabda9/without-intent-how-congress-is-eroding-the-criminal-intent-requirementin-federal-law.pdf (discussing the increased number of statutes and how many of these
statutes have no or a low mens rea); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001) (discussing the political economy of criminal law).
261. Decker, supra note 5, at 128–29.
262. In his statements, Attorney General Barr did say that this was not only his decision
but the decision of prior Acting Attorney General Rod Rosenstein. See Barr, supra note 151,
reprinted in ELLEN S. PODGOR, KATRICE BRIDGES COPELAND, MICHAEL R. DIMINO, SR.,
RUTHANN ROBSON, LOUIS J. VIRELLI III, ANDREW M. WRIGHT & ELLEN C. YAROSHEFSKY, THE
MUELLER INVESTIGATION AND BEYOND 16 (2020).
263. See United States v. Williamson, 746 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming an
obstruction case premised on impeding due administration of Internal Revenue laws).
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Confining prosecutorial discretion is difficult.264 One can
educate prosecutors,265 confine statutes, readjust federal rules of
evidence, and provide closer judicial oversight to achieve reform.
For example, the Supreme Court rejected prosecutors using a
Sarbanes-Oxley statute pertaining to document destruction as a
basis for charging obstruction of justice against a Florida fisherman
for throwing overboard undersized fish that he was told to bring
back to shore.266 But the Supreme Court’s reversal of the
government’s use of an obstruction charge against fisherman John
Yates did not alleviate the collateral consequences he suffered of
having his fishing business decimated by the government’s
stretching of this obstruction statute.
Government oversight prior to indictment provided in cases
involving lawyers,267 international matters, and other high-profile
individuals268 is not provided in typical street crime cases.
Charging decisions in cases that are not front-pagers may be a
single decision of a prosecutor who may be influenced by extensive
dollars spent by law enforcement in investigating the case that he
or she feels the need to placate the investigators’ time, effort, and
expense. And even with the use of Department of Justice
Guidelines, their flexibility and status as mere guidance precludes
them from offering consistency, as they are unenforceable at law.269
As profoundly noted by Professor Angela Davis, at a minimum,
reform should achieve goals of “(1) the elimination of the arbitrary
exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and (2) the establishment of
initiatives to strengthen the current mechanisms of prosecutorial
accountability.”270 Achieving these goals is possible here.

264. See generally Lisa Kern Griffin, Criminal Lying, Prosecutorial Power, and Social
Meaning, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1515 (2009) (discussing prosecutorial power with process crimes).
265. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, The Ethics and Professionalism of Prosecutors in
Discretionary Decisions, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1511 (2000) (calling for increased education for
prosecutors in their discretionary decision-making role).
266. Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015).
267. U.S. Dep’t of Just., Just. Manual § 9-2.032 (2020), https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm9-2000-authority-us-attorney-criminal-division-mattersprior-approvals#9-2.400.
268. See id. § 9-2.400. In the cases with international implications, the oversight is often
to avoid international ramifications.
269. See generally Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing
“Discretionary Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2004) (discussing the nonenforceability of Department of Justice internal guidelines).
270. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 180.
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Suggested here is that transparency can offer better
accountability.271 More data is needed to fully consider the charging
practices in the obstruction of justice realm. The data available in
the sentencing realm needs to be replicated in the charging arena.
The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s data provides the number of
cases having the lead charge for each obstruction of justice statute.
It also provides the sentence on each of these cases. But it fails
to provide the charging numbers as well as the pre-indictment
bargaining numbers that may have occurred in determining
whether obstruction of justice would be charged or not.
Data transparency will also offer defense counsel with a wider
range of arguments against charges that are outside the norms in
the practice. It allows those in a smaller U.S. Attorney’s Office, like
Wyoming, the ability to compare what is happening in their locale
with situations in New York or Washington, D.C. Consistency can
be enhanced with increased data compilation. It also allows courts
to offer better oversight and accountability272 when considering
pre-trial motions and sentencing recommendations.
This data can also be influential in the impeachment world. It
will allow consideration of whether there were criminal cases
indicted for alleged lies in a civil action or claimed stonewalling of
congressional subpoenas, the basis for the Clinton and Trump
Impeachments. Data that reflects this information, data that is not
quickly pulled together by the press to discuss actual charges,
offers the public the ability to properly assess government actions.
Obstruction of justice is an important crime in that it
rests at the heart of our administration of justice. Haphazard
results in prosecutions, sentencings, and impeachments foster
distrust in the government. Transparency, in contrast, can
increase accountability.273

271. See generally David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62 STAN. L. REV. 257 (2010) (discussing
the flaws with secrecy); Louis J. Virelli III & Ellen S. Podgor, Secret Policies, 2019 U. ILL. L.
REV. 463 (2019) (noting how accountability is at the heart of legitimacy); PROSECUTORS AND
DEMOCRACY: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY (Máximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds., 2017)
(providing comparative essays on prosecutorial accountability).
272. See generally Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2016) (discussing the need for prosecutorial accountability to correct
prosecutorial misconduct).
273. Virelli & Podgor, supra note 271, at 503.
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